Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia: Evaluating Evo Morales\u27 Mandate to the Poor by Nimz, Abigail
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2011
Government Responsiveness and Targeted
Spending in Bolivia: Evaluating Evo Morales'
Mandate to the Poor
Abigail Nimz
University of Colorado at Boulder
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nimz, Abigail, "Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia: Evaluating Evo Morales' Mandate to the Poor" (2011).
Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 3.
 Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia: 
Evaluating Evo Morales‘ Mandate to the Poor     
          
Abigail Nimz 
International Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Carew Boulding 
Department of Political Science 
Thesis Advisor 
 
Dr. Vicki Hunter 
Department of International Affairs 
 
Dr. Carol Conzelman 
Department of Anthropology 
 
Dr. Angela Thieman-Dino 
Department of Anthropology 
 
 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
 
April 4, 2011 
 
 
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia ii 
 
Table of Contents: 
 
Acknowledgements         iv 
 
Abstract            1  
 
Introduction           2 
 
Chapter One: Theory on Government Responsiveness     9  
1.1 Government responsiveness and regime type  
1.2 Clientelism and targeted spending in developing democracies 
1.3 The electoral and participation theories 
 
Chapter Two: The New Left in Latin America     19  
2.1 Historical context and the definition of the New Left 
2.2 Development and themes of the New Left  
2.3 Radicals and Reformers: Classifying New Left leaders  
2.4 The New Left in Bolivia 
 
Chapter Three: Indigenous Mobilization and Influence in Bolivia  31 
3.1 Spanish colonial legacy and indigenous marginalization 
3.2 Constitutional changes and the rise of indigenous politics 
3.3 The Beginnings of MAS   
 
Chapter Four: Theory to be Tested       46 
4.1 The core and swing vote theories  
4.2 The electoral and participation theories  
 
Chapter Five: Methodology        49 
5.1 The Bolivian case 
5.2 Data collection 
5.3 Variables and their significance 
5.4 Explanation of the model 
 
Chapter Six: Findings         62 
6.1 Swing voters and targeted spending 
6.2 Participation and targeted spending 
6.3 Discussion of the findings 
 
Conclusion           71 
 
References           74 
 
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia iii 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures: 
Figure 1: CPP Transfers from 2001-2009      55 
Figure 2: HIPC Transfers  from 2001-2009      56 
Figure 3: IDH Transfers from 2001-2009      57 
Figure 4: Total Average Transfers from 2001-2009     58 
Figure 5: Average Social Spending from 2001-2007    60 
Figure 6: Average Energy Spending from 2001-2007    61 
Table 1: Transfers and Vote Share for Evo Morales     64 
  
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia iv 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would not have been possible without the continued guidance and support of several 
individuals. First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Carew Boulding for her integral 
mentorship, feedback, and encouragement throughout the process. I would also like to thank Dr. 
Vicki Hunter, Dr. Carol Conzelman, and Dr. Angela Dino for their help and support. 
Additionally, I would like to thank the Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program for 
graciously providing funding for this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia 1 
 
Abstract: 
 This thesis explores factors that contribute to government responsiveness in Bolivia. It 
analyzes the question, under what conditions, if any, do political parties in developing 
democracies fulfill their mandates to the poor by increasing federal transfers? Evo Morales was 
elected with a sweeping mandate to change the historic exclusion of the poor and indigenous 
groups in Bolivia and increase spending to raise their quality of life, and his unique mandate 
provides a case study to answer this question. To provide background and present existing 
debates, theories of government responsiveness, the regional New Left political context, and the 
effect of the indigenous movement on Evo Morales‘ leadership were discussed. To test these 
theories, the core and swing voter theories and the participation and electoral theories of 
democratic responsiveness were analyzed. An original data set with social and financial data 
from Bolivian municipalities was used to run an OLS regression. The regression tests the 
relationship between the independent variable, vote share for Evo Morales, and the dependent 
variable, change in federal transfers to municipalities, to measure government responsiveness. 
Ultimately, the results support the participation and swing vote theories of government 
responsiveness. Municipalities with higher levels of participation and municipalities that did not 
support Evo Morales received increased average transfers. These findings present a new 
perspective on government responsiveness in Bolivia and apply to the broader study of 
government responsiveness in developing democracies.  
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Introduction 
In the small South American country of Bolivia, indigenous voices have been repressed 
or ignored for centuries. A small elite exploited and excluded them from the political arena. 
Although they showed continued resistance and protest with some success, like the Bolivian 
Revolution of 1952, the exclusion persisted. Nevertheless, their power increased in the 1990s 
with the decentralization of the Bolivian democratic system. Driven by the poverty and 
inequality they faced, social movements and smaller political parties gained momentum and used 
the new outlets to voice their demands. After fifteen years of neoliberal reforms that hurt the 
poorest citizens while the wealthy elite gained, they demanded a new way of life. From 
roadblocks and protests, to coca farmers organizing in the highlands, they raised their voices for 
change.  
At the forefront of this mass mobilization were Evo Morales and his political party 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). They claimed, ―Somos pueblo, somos MAS,‖ or we are the 
people, we are MAS (more) (Postero, 2010, p. 24). Evo Morales was elected with a unique and 
broad mandate to the poor and indigenous populations. They identified with him and voted him 
into power because of his claims to improve their situations. Morales rose up through the 
government with core support from the indigenous, rural, and poor. He entered office with a 
powerful mandate to reduce the political exclusion and improve the quality of life for all 
Bolivians in 2006. Now in 2011, what are the tangible results of this dramatic shift? Has Evo 
Morales fulfilled his mandate to the poor or focused on other national priorities? To explore 
answers to these questions, this thesis first attempted to answer a broader research question: 
Under what conditions, if any, do political parties in developing democracies fulfill their 
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mandates to the poor by increasing federal transfers? Ultimately, the Bolivian case study was 
used to see what factors contribute to government responsiveness in developing democracies.   
A political science perspective was used to evaluate Evo Morales‘ responsiveness to his 
constituents. Studying government responsiveness, defined as the contributions that the 
government makes to its people based on stated goals and citizens‘ demands, furthers the study 
of democracy because it takes a closer look at different factors that influence government 
actions. This study uses federal transfers as a measure of government responsiveness because 
they can show direct targeted spending from the federal government to the municipalities and 
indicate government decisions to prioritize spending to certain groups. Ultimately, this thesis 
argues that Morales is attempting to influence swing voters and is responding to municipalities 
with high levels of participation. Swing voters are those who did not vote for Evo Morales in the 
2005 election and participation is an indicator of participation both in elections and in civil 
society through NGOs. These important findings show that Evo Morales is not responding to his 
base as his rhetoric suggests; instead, he is using government transfers to widen his base and 
further his political gains. Given these findings, politicians in developing democracies might 
struggle to fulfill their promises to core supporters when they face pressure from other groups. 
However, the indicator of participation shows that more active areas gained increased transfers. 
Morales is responding to highly mobilized municipalities that pressure the government from 
inside and outside the electoral sphere. In developing democracies where politicians face many 
constraints to spending and unity, active participation is one way to get the government to 
respond. 
The Bolivian case is especially interesting because it provides an example of a 
developing country that has recently elected a pro-poor party with a mandate for sweeping 
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia 4 
 
change. Bolivians participated in active protests and blockades between 2000 and 2005, forcing 
out presidents and influencing the political system from the outside. Morales represents the 
popular demand for change within Bolivia because he is an indigenous leader that gained his 
leadership experience in the agrarian and mining labor unions and social movements, instead of a 
leader from the wealthy elite. MAS and Morales claim to represent historically marginalized 
groups, especially indigenous populations, social movements, and the poor.  
In his inaugural speech Morales stated, ―The past 500 years of Indian resistance have not 
been in vain. From 500 years of resistance we pass to another 500 years in power…. We are here 
and we say that we have achieved power to end the injustice, the inequality and oppression that 
we have lived under‖ (BBC, 2006).  His rhetoric speaks of a new era for Bolivians by making the 
economic system more equitable and increasing government welfare to address Bolivians‘ basic 
needs. He also speaks of indigenous changes and representation. This is especially relevant in 
Bolivia, where in the 2001 Census, 62% of the population identified themselves as indigenous 
(Dunkerley, 2007).  Morales speaks of broad change for Bolivians, but it is crucial to evaluate 
what factors have actually caused him to respond to his constituents. The Bolivian case is 
interesting to the study of democratic responsiveness because of the historic change that Evo 
Morales represents; he represents the Bolivian people in a way that no Bolivian president has 
before and his citizens are more active and organized than they ever have been before. The 
unique mandate, coupled with interesting constraints and patterns in developing democracies, 
creates an especially relevant study of democratic responsiveness.  
To provide background, this thesis explores the literature on government responsiveness, 
the broader context of the New Left in Latin America, and the influence of indigenous culture on 
Morales‘ leadership style and goals. The background and existing literature in each section 
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provide a foundation for the quantitative research. The quantitative section uses the change in 
federal transfers to municipalities as a measure of government responsiveness because of the 
potential for targeted spending.  The results and analysis show that participation and swing vote 
status are two specific factors that increase government responsiveness. By providing specific 
factors that lead to government responsiveness, these findings further the question: what 
conditions lead to government responsiveness in developing democracies?  
To begin, the first chapter analyzes the existing literature and theory on government 
responsiveness and provides a framework to understand the Bolivian case. The current literature 
on democracy in Latin America has found that democratic governments are more responsive to 
their citizens than autocratic governments. The very foundation of democracy includes methods 
for citizens to pressure governments to respond, including voting, protest, and organization. 
Although there is a consensus that democratic governments promote responsiveness, there is a 
debate over what factors cause them to respond to their citizens. Additionally, there are distinct 
differences between developing democracies and established democracies in how and why they 
respond to their citizens. Much of the existing literature uses national level data or qualitative 
data to support its findings. Additionally, where sub-national data is used, scholars use 
conflicting measures that support different results. This paper will contribute to the existing 
literature because it uses sub-national data to support broad theories of democracy and 
government responsiveness. It builds on previous sub-national studies, but provides both a new 
case and a new form of measurement to further the study of democracy and government 
responsiveness in Latin America. 
The second chapter builds on the ideas of democratic governance and responsiveness 
because it provides the context for change within Latin America with the rise of the New Left. 
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The wider scope of political and economic factors is important because they affect both the 
actions of MAS and Evo Morales and the international perception of their actions. This chapter 
covers the background behind the major political patterns in Latin America leading to the 
development of the New Left and the current literature. Current debates include reasons behind 
the rise of the left and the classification or interpretation of the New Left movement. This thesis 
will further the debate by using quantitative data and analysis on a specific case instead of 
generalizing about New Left categories. It seeks to understand how the New Left movement is 
impacting both the mandate and the actions of Evo Morales. 
After setting up the regional context that affects Bolivia in chapter two, chapter three will 
identify Bolivia‘s political system and indigenous organization. This chapter will cover the 
development of the indigenous political movement in Bolivia, which is essential to understand 
the leadership and process of Evo Morales. The collective style of governance seen in the 
Bolivian highlands through the sindicato system of land control affects how the new indigenous 
government perceives its role and the way that it executes policy. Constitutional changes also 
have provided a pathway of leadership and community organization leading to the election of  
Evo Morales. The development of a strong indigenous political voice stems from the 
combination of indigenous values and identity, historic marginalization and poverty, and the 
effects of neoliberalism. Additionally, participation outside of the political sphere is especially 
relevant in Bolivia because it has often been the only effective method to get the government to 
respond. This chapter will outline the history behind indigenous marginalization, constitutional 
changes and their effect on indigenous movements, and the effect of indigenous heritage and 
sindicato involvement on the leadership of Evo Morales and MAS.  
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Bolivia will provide a case study to measure factors that lead to government 
responsiveness in developing democracies because of its recent political changes, its poverty and 
indigenous population levels, and the New Left leadership of MAS and Evo Morales. This thesis 
seeks to understand the tangible changes that Morales is making in Bolivia. Some scholars 
support Evo Morales and others voice doubts about the policies that back his rhetoric. However, 
there is very little quantitative data in to support either stance. In a country like Bolivia, with 
extreme levels of poverty and high social action, as indicated by the protests in 2000-2005, it is 
valuable to assess the actions of the Bolivian government. Additionally, this paper helps to 
evaluate the responsiveness and accountability of a developing democracy and identify the 
factors that make a government more or less likely to respond to its constituents. Inequality and 
social justice are at the base of this issue because the power structure has been centered in the 
elite, and the elite has marginalized the majority of the population. Morales faces huge 
challenges, including corruption and economic issues, but it is important to evaluate his actual 
actions in fulfilling his mandate to the poor beyond his stated goals.  
For the methodology, this thesis used qualitative data to analyze the existing literature 
and present theory and quantitative data to test the hypotheses of government responsiveness. 
Municipality data was used to see what factors increase the ability or drive for MAS to fulfill 
pre-election promises and gain insight into government accountability in a developing 
democracy. An original dataset that covers the 327 Bolivian municipalities was analyzed to see 
the connection between vote share for Evo Morales and changes in federal transfers during the 
2005-2009 period. The independent variable was vote share for Evo Morales, and the dependent 
variable was the change in total average transfers to the municipality. Through this analysis, 
circumstances that lead Morales to increase social spending or factors that may prevent MAS 
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from fulfilling their pro-poor mandate were evaluated. Possible factors that may influence MAS 
include local political competition, social mobilization, and core or swing vote status.  Overall, 
Bolivia provided a case study to see what circumstances might increase a pro-poor party‘s ability 
or drive to increase social spending and evaluate the tangible contributions or lack of 
contributions that MAS is providing for its base.  
Overall, this thesis found that Morales directs transfers to swing voters at a higher rate 
than his core supporters and to municipalities with higher rates of participation. It used an OLS 
regression to test the relationship between the variables and finds significant relationships 
between increased transfers and measures of participation and swing vote status. Moreover, 
indicators that correlate with support for Evo Morales, such as indigenous or rural 
characteristics, did not have any significant effect on the level of transfers. Lower levels of 
income also did not have increased transfers, which show that pro-poor politics are not the 
driving force for increased transfers. These indicate that Evo Morales is not fulfilling his 
mandate to the poor through transfers.  
The significance of the transfers away from core supporters calls into question Morales 
rhetoric and stated goals for the indigenous and poor populations. It does not seem that Morales 
is focusing his spending to the poor or his core supporters, which is an interesting finding 
considering his broad mandate and rhetoric for change. The significance of participation also 
provides remarkable support for a factor that contributes to government responsiveness. 
Ultimately, this thesis shows that Evo Morales has not fulfilled his mandate to the poor by 
increasing targeted spending. However, it also opens up further areas for research and other 
studies in the debate of government responsiveness in developing democracies.  
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Chapter One: Democracy and Government Responsiveness 
The nature and activity of democratic governments is a widely studied topic in many 
disciplines, with many methods of study and perspectives on the issue. The current literature on 
democracy in Latin America shows that democratic governments are more responsive to their 
citizens than autocratic governments. This seems logical because the very foundation of 
democracy includes incentives for government responsiveness such as elections, protest, and 
organization. Although there is a consensus that democratic governments promote 
responsiveness, scholars debate over what factors cause them to respond to their citizens. 
Additionally, democratic responsiveness differs between developing democracies and 
established democracies in how and why they respond to their citizens. Much of the existing 
literature uses qualitative data or national level data to support its findings. Where sub-national 
data is used, conflicting measures and results are found. This paper will contribute to the existing 
literature because it uses sub-national data to support broad theories of democracy and 
government responsiveness. It builds on previous sub-national studies, but it provides both a new 
case and a new form of measurement to further the study of democracy and government 
responsiveness in Latin America. 
Before entering into the debate over democracy and government responsiveness in Latin 
America, is it important to define the terms. Democracy has many definitions and has changed 
over time, but several essential aspects are required for government to be democratic. These 
criteria include governing based on free and fair elections, universal suffrage, protection of basic 
freedoms, accountability through laws, and civilian control of the military (Fox, 1994). Peeler 
adds that democratization is a process with different stages, including stabilization and 
consolidation (2009). Stabilization indicates that a country has passed through several electoral 
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cycles while maintaining rules and procedures. The consolidation process moves one step 
further; the government becomes legitimate and democracy becomes the only acceptable method 
for gaining power (Peeler, 2009). Most democracies in Latin America are stable, but they cover 
varying levels of consolidation. Democracy provides an institutional framework for governing 
that takes into account the desires of the people. It also provides incentives for governments to 
respond to citizens‘ demands through elections and pressure from popular organization.  Even 
so, Dahl notes that actual democracies only partially achieve the goals of an ideal democracy 
(1998). The basic ideals and definitions of democracy and government responsiveness are 
foundational to the study of democracy and provide background to the literature. 
Regime Type and Government Responsiveness 
One consensus in the literature identifies regime type as a major factor of government 
responsiveness. Brown and Hunter (1999) looked at differences in responsiveness between 
authoritarian regimes and democracies in Latin America. In periods of economic crisis, they 
found that democratic countries increased funding of public programs to help their citizens more 
than authoritarian countries. Overall, democratic governments were more responsive to political 
factors that could be influenced by popular demand, while authoritarian regimes were more 
sensitive to economic constraints. They found that the most significant difference in social 
spending between regime types occurred with the least economically developed countries 
(Brown & Hunter, 1999).  Lake and Baum (2001) found similar results after exploring the 
connection between democratic or autocratic governments and the level of public services. Their 
data supported the conclusion that democracy leads to higher levels of public services and that 
democratic governments have a measurable, positive effect on individuals in their countries. 
Brown and Hunter (2004) also found that democracies increased human capital by spending 
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more money on education. These findings provide a foundation for the study of democracy in 
Latin America because democratic regimes promote government responsiveness more than other 
forms of government. Within the classification of ―democracy,‖ however, there are variations on 
how governments respond and their tangible contributions to their populations. The Bolivian 
case will provide a specific example of a democratic regime and analyze government 
responsiveness through that lens to further this study. Although regime type is important to 
understand responsiveness, the level of democratic consolidation also affects how a government 
responds. The next section will discuss how developing democracies differ from established 
democracies in constraints, democratic process, and responsiveness.  
Developing Democracies: Credibility and Targeted Spending  
Although both established and developing democracies are democratic, the level of 
democratization changes the ability and incentives for governments to respond to their citizens. 
Some scholars argue that existing intermediaries between the government and the population 
determine how a developing democratic government will respond. Keefer et al. (2008) argues 
that politicians in developing democracies use patron-client networks to build credibility and 
then target government spending towards those networks. Patron-client networks are 
intermediaries between the government and individuals that can mobilize on behalf of the 
politician and push policies that benefit their clients specifically. This is related to clientelism, or 
―a relationship based on political subordination for material rewards‖ (Fox, 1994, p.153). This 
system is more evident in developing democracies than established democracies because 
developing democracies must gain citizens‘ trust in the institutions and build credibility, while 
established democracies have already strengthened their credibility over time. Moreover, 
developing democracies have lower levels of democratic consolidation, while established 
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democracies have largely completed the process. Because many democracies in Latin America 
only re-emerged with a lasting effect during the 1980s and 1990s and developing democracies 
are prevalent in the region, factors that influence responsiveness relating to newer democracies 
are especially relevant. This thesis will provide further information relating to the discussion of 
clientelism because it analyzes the causes of government responsiveness in Bolivia, which is a 
developing democracy that has historically been prone to patron-client networks and corruption.  
Mazzuca (2010) presents a new framework for developing democracies that includes the 
difference between access to power and exercise of power in Latin America. He uses this 
distinction to explain how clientelism relates to government responsiveness. Access to power, 
defined as the ability for citizens to vote in free and fair elections is distinct from exercise of 
power, which is the ability for citizens to influence the government agenda once in power 
(Mazzuca, 2010). He argues that most scholars focus on democratization and access to power 
through elections, but exercise of power, illustrated in clientelism and corruption, is the real 
problem in this region. The difference between regime transition in a democracy and the how 
institutions actually function presents a different perspective on the issues in Latin America 
(Mazzuca, 2010). This thesis will further this debate because it looks at the connection between 
voting in elections (access) and government spending (exercise). Combining the concepts of 
access and exercise provides a more holistic view of government responsiveness in Bolivia 
because it acknowledges factors outside of elections that influence government action.  
Further literature related to exercise of power shows that clientelism is a result of specific 
constraints faced by developing democracies. Keefer et al. found that there were different 
government spending patterns in established democracies countries compared with 
democratizing countries (2008). In newer democracies, credibility in the institutions has not yet 
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been established and the costs to building credibility are high. These politicians must directing 
resources towards voters by increasing government spending or by targeting spending into 
patron-client networks to increase their credibility.  As an alternative to building credibility 
through broad programs that improve all citizens‘ quality of life, Keefer et al. found that 
politicians target spending to well-established patron-client networks to gain support with less 
overall cost. This shifts incentives away from public goods that benefit all people and can hurt 
the development of broad political parties an towards targeted spending to specific groups 
(Keefer, 2008). Additionally, the relationship is asymmetrical, where the client relies on the 
patron for basic needs, but the patron has the power to withhold goods or services if the client 
does not provide political support (Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003). The intermediaries 
undermine democratic institutions and prevent individuals from having exercise to power 
because the patrons control the agenda.  
In Latin America, there is evidence of clientelism, but there is a debate over when funds 
are disproportionately distributed to patron-client networks. The two prominent theories are the 
core theory and the swing vote theory. The core theory states that politicians will target spending 
to groups that provide core support to maintain power. Although this is a secure investment, 
there is a risk that this targeting spending will not alter election outcomes because voters are 
already committed. Alternately, the swing vote theory states that politicians will target spending 
to undecided voters to push the balance in their favor (Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003). Both 
theories represent politicians targeting spending into specific groups to sway political outcomes, 
essentially ―buying‖ the vote and undermining democracy, but they differ on the decision-
making criteria.  
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There have been several studies in developing democracies regarding targeted spending 
to swing voters and core supporters. Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2003) outline several 
important studies for developing democracies in an overview of targeted spending. The first 
study looks at Fujimori‘s actions in Peru. Schady (2000) found specific patterns of the Peruvian 
Social Fund‘s (FONCODES) spending. He found that spending increased significantly before 
national elections, and it was directed to areas that would cause the most political gains including 
core supporters, marginal voters and the poor. In addition, analysis of Mexican targeted spending 
showed that the PRI targeted core supporters and places with competitive elections (Estevez et 
al. 2000; Molinar & Weldon, 1994). On the other hand, Khemani found support for the swing 
vote theory using data from Indian states (2002). Khemani‘s study shows that targeted spending 
to states increased when the party controlling the federal government had fewer seats in the 
legislature. In this situation, the government used spending to sway swing voters and increase 
legislative control. In addition to the studies discussed by Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, further 
research in South Korea supports the swing vote theory. Kwon (2005) found that South Korea‘s 
government increased spending based on election times. Kwon also found that the government 
targeted national funds to swing vote providences with competitive elections (2005). Overall, 
there is evidence that politicians target spending to both core and swing voters in developing 
democracies.  
In a related article, Keefer and Khemani (2005) looked at additional factors that 
influenced political incentives to increase social spending and decrease poverty. They argue that 
three major factors shift spending away from the poor: a lack of information about political 
performance for the poor, social fragmentation, which leads to voting based on personal 
connections, and a lack of credibility. The lack of credibility is particularly important because in 
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developing democracies, where there is little credibility overall, there is less incentive for 
politicians to deliver on their promises. Additionally, reforms that do occur will have short-term 
goals for which politicians can take credit (Keefer & Khemani, 2005). Fox finds similar results 
and argues that clientelism is more attractive where there is high inequality, possible political 
gains or losses are high, and the government is less productive (1994). These factors within a 
democracy change government incentives to fulfill promises to the population.  
The Electoral and Participation Theories of Democracy 
Continuing the debate over what causes governments to respond, there are two competing 
theories to show how democratic participation leads to increased government responsiveness. 
The first, the electoral theory, states that voters threaten to remove or select leaders through 
elections, which provides incentives for politicians to respond to demands (Cleary, 2007). On the 
other hand, the participation theory argues that responsiveness is based on pressure through 
action, such as protest or collective organization (Cleary, 2007). These theories provide the basis 
for the debate over whether competition in elections or participation leads to increased 
government responsiveness. 
In the literature, support for each side of the argument prevents a broad consensus on 
factors that promote government responsiveness. In 2006, Hecock found that competitive 
elections caused increases in education spending using primary education data from Mexico. 
Based on this data, competition did influence social spending (Hecock, 2006). Stasavage (2005) 
found similar results in African democracies, where electoral competition increased spending on 
education. These findings provide support for the electoral theory of democracy. However, 
Cleary (2007) also used Mexico as a case study, but came to the opposite conclusion. He found 
no relationship between the level of competition in elections and government performance in 
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providing basic needs to the population. Instead, he found that government performance was 
higher where other forms of participation were higher, which supports the participatory theory. 
Other findings from Moreno-Jaimes (2007) also discounted the electoral theory because there 
was no relationship between competition and service provision. This paper found that 
socioeconomic status and modernity, measured by poverty level and literacy respectively, and 
direct pressure correlated with an increase in services (Moreno-Jaimes, 2007). Depending on the 
indicators used to measure responsiveness, the studies arrived at different conclusions.  
Related to the participation theory, many Latin American scholars explore the effects of 
social movements, NGOs, and other grassroots actors outside of the traditional political sphere. 
Vanden argues that social movements work within civil society to pressure government 
responsiveness (2007). He notes it is important that these movements worked from below 
through organization and coalitions, which sets them apart from other forms of political 
participation (2007).  Vanden used the Bolivian and Brazilian cases to show that broad 
mobilization of grassroots groups helped force government change and shape new government 
agendas. Participation through protests, roadblocks, and other direct actions spurred change, not 
voting or electoral pressure. In addition to social movements, NGOs can also help mobilize 
people to act outside of the electoral system. Boulding (2010) found that NGOs help provide 
avenues for participation and can lead to protest or demonstrations in weak democracies where 
voting is not seen as effective. Boulding used local-level Bolivian data to show the connection 
between NGO activity and political protest. There is evidence that non-electoral methods of 
participation can influence government outcomes, and this paper will further the discussion by 
looking at the relationship between government responsiveness and both the electoral results and 
indicators of participation. 
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The conclusions from these studies do not provide a definitive answer for the cause of 
government responsiveness because they use different indicators to support opposite 
conclusions. Given that education increases equality of a population and citizens‘ economic 
competitiveness, Hecock and Stasavage used education spending to evaluate responsiveness 
(2006). As an alternative measure, Cleary and Moreno-Jaimes used water and sanitation 
spending because it shows a government‘s responsiveness to the basic needs of a population 
(2007). There is currently a gap in the knowledge, and neither theory has been entirely 
conclusive. This thesis will contribute to the existing literature and further the debate over factors 
leading to government responsiveness because both measures of electoral competition and 
participation were analyzed in the regression model. Additionally, this thesis used a broader 
indicator of government responsiveness: federal transfers to local governments. This measure is 
beneficial because other indicators such as education and sanitation can increase for a variety of 
reasons on the local level. Federal transfers are more indicative of government responsiveness to 
specific municipalities because they are direct and they follow certain criteria, but can still have 
targeted spending. The new measure and further analysis will contribute to the debate.  
Conclusion: 
In the existing literature on democracy and government responsiveness, there is much 
debate over how and why governments respond in different situations. There is a consensus in 
the literature that democratic regimes are more responsive to their citizens than authoritarian 
regimes. However, there are also distinct differences between developing democracies and 
established democracies. Developing democracies are more vulnerable to clientelism and other 
constraints that lead to corruption or a lack of responsiveness. Additionally, there is a debate 
related to the electoral process over how governments target spending to certain groups to gain 
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favorable political results, concerning swing voter or core supporter targeted spending. Factors, 
such as clientelism and access to power or exercise of power, and differences in education or 
information complicate the discussion of government responsiveness.   Another major debate in 
the literature argues over whether democratic governments respond due to fear of punishment in 
elections or from direct pressure and participation. Overall, there are many theories on why 
governments respond, but no clear consensus.  This thesis continues to add to the discussion of 
government responsiveness because it includes analysis of voting, participation, and government 
spending. It combines several key aspects of the debate and acknowledges many possible causes 
of government responsiveness using novel sub-national data.  
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Chapter Two: Latin American Trends and the New Left 
Building on the topic of democracy, this chapter will show the leftward trend of elected 
politicians in Latin America. The New Left is important because the political changes occurring 
in Bolivia are not taking place in a vacuum; they fit within the larger context of the events 
happening in Latin America. The wider scope of political and economic factors affects the 
actions of Evo Morales and the international perception of his actions. There are distinct 
differences between countries, but at the same time, a general trend of a political shift to the left 
is currently occurring in Latin America. The New Left represents political parties that focus on 
social justice, an active role of the state, and opposition to US hegemony (Carlsen, 2005). It 
stems from the same problems, like poverty and political exclusion, that motivated the 
revolutionary left to attempt to overthrow existing regimes in Latin America using Marxist 
ideology and armed resistance; however, the New Left works within existing democratic 
institutions to gain change.  This chapter will cover the background behind the major political 
patterns in Latin America leading to the development of the New Left and the current literature. 
The context of the New Left will provide insight into the political changes occurring in Bolivia. 
Historical Context and the Development of the New Left: 
The development of the New Left stems from political and social actions during the 
twentieth century that failed to resolve the deep inequality within Latin American societies. 
Previously, revolutionary movements were one way that Latin Americans attempted to change 
political and social conditions through mobilization and radical change. There was some 
progress, but a strong US reaction and support of opposition limited revolutionary success. 
Another way that governments attempted to increase the quality of life was through economic 
policies intended to promote growth and generate wealth, first with Import Substitution 
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Industrialization (ISI) in the 1960s and 70s, and then with neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 
90s. The debt crisis of the 1980‘s and international pressure eliminated ISI, and international 
institutions replaced it with the neoliberal model, which generated wealth at the expense of the 
poor and increased inequality. After analyzing broad regional trends, Petras argues that three 
waves of development occurred in Latin America. The first is the revolutionary phase in the 
1960s and 1970s inspired by Fidel Castro and the Cuban model, termed fidelistas. The second is 
reform opposition through the existing system under authoritarian leaders and neoliberalism, and 
the last is ―extra-parliamentary social movements‖ during the 1990s (Petras, 1997). Both social 
revolutionary movements and economic changes have not fixed the large problems in Latin 
America, and the New Left is the most recent movement to attempt to change the status quo.  
Exclusion from the political system, large inequality, and poor living conditions spurred 
the formation of revolutionary movements all over Latin America in the middle of the 20
th
 
century. From Bolivia and Cuba in the 1950‘s to Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador in the 
1970‘s and 1980‘s, violent revolutionary groups mobilized. The Bolivian Revolution took place 
in 1952, when the National Revolutionary Party (MNR) seized control of the government. In 
1951, the government had declared them a communist threat and prevented their elected 
representatives from taking office, so the party organized a civil-military coup. Initially an upper 
and middle class organization, the MNR broadened its base to include the left, especially 
workers, in order to succeed (Selbin, 1999). The reformist government of the MNR went on to 
institute universal suffrage, mass education, and agrarian reform (Gustafson, 2002). The Bolivian 
Revolution had lasting implications for Bolivians, such as land reform and universal suffrage, 
but the MNR‘s internal divisions caused its revolutionary control to fade away. 
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia 21 
 
 Taking a step back and looking at the entire region, the Cuban Revolution was more 
significant and became a model for revolutionaries all over Latin America. Cuba visibly helped 
its poorest citizens through a literacy program, agrarian reform, health care reform, and broke 
away from US control (Wright, 2001).  Afterwards, Cubans provided support, a model for 
revolution, and inspiration to other groups who attempted to follow in their footsteps (Wright, 
2001). However, revolutionary groups that followed in other countries faced US determination to 
prevent another socialist state in Latin America (Wright, 2001).  In the Cold War context, a 
violent backlash from the United States and the political right resulted in an eventual decline of 
the revolutionary left. The US provided funding and support to counter-revolutionary forces all 
over Latin America, which led to the rise of US-backed military dictatorships. Due to the 
violence and the lack of success that resulted from many revolutionary efforts, the left was 
discredited and lost much of its following. The revolutionary movements that had exploded all 
over Latin American eventually lost their ability to create change and people searched for new 
ways to change the system. 
Aside from revolutionary movements, the region was also attempting to solve problems 
through economic growth. However, many of the broad economic changes resulted from 
international pressure or a reaction to outside exploitation. According to Willis (2005), 
Modernization Theory provided a stages of growth model for countries to progress (Rostow, 
1960), which caused northern states, like the US, to enact policy on southern states, like Bolivia, 
and continue imperial relationships. As a reaction, Latin American scholars developed 
Dependency Theory to explain the process of under-development in Latin America. In this 
theory, continuing exploitation by the Northern states prevented economic growth in Southern 
states (Willis, 2005). Many countries adjusted to Import Substitution Industrialization policies in 
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the 1960s using the Dependency Theory as a model (Willis, 2005). ISI involved governments 
offering protection and subsidies for industry to increase growth (Grilli, 2005). Growth varied 
between countries but was consistently fast overall from 1950 to 1973, especially in the 
manufacturing sector due to state incentives (Grilli, 2005). In addition, there were overall gains 
in traditional measures of development, such as poverty reduction, life expectancy, and 
education (Grilli, 2005). Due to inefficiency, however, long-term growth was unsustainable in 
the ISI model. Furthermore, oil shocks in the late 1970‘s hurt many countries, causing them to 
borrow from international organizations. The combination of ISI and external debt forced 
countries into crisis in most of the region (Grilli, 2005).  
Another factor that ultimately paved the way for the rise of the New Left was the opening 
of democratic systems in Latin America. During the 1960s and 1970s, many countries were 
controlled by harsh dictatorships. However, by the 1980s, civil society groups finally forced a 
return to democracy. The shift towards democratic regimes is called the ―third wave‖ of 
democracy. The Huntington describes this ―third wave‖ of democracy as a global movement 
towards democratic institutions (1991). As democratizing nations, many Latin American 
countries faced problems of corruption and heavy debt incurred by the dictators, but the ability of 
citizens to influence the government had increased.  
After a return to democratic governance, Latin American countries borrowed from 
international institutions in the 1980s and were required to adopt structural adjustment programs. 
International institutions, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed 
neoliberal policies, which opened countries to international markets by lowering trade barriers, 
increasing privatization of industry, and decreasing state expenditures on social services. The 
neoliberal policies that promote free trade are also known as the Washington Consensus. Harvey 
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(2005) explains that in the neoliberal model, individual freedoms are prioritized and the state 
takes a smaller role. Although neoliberalism is based on the ideals of individual freedom and 
human dignity, there are many problems and contradictions within the model. For example, the 
market fails to protect workers and the environment because they are seen as commodities, and 
interests of international corporations are often prioritized over citizens of a country (Harvey, 
2005). These policies increased wealth, GDP per capita, and promoted economic growth, but 
also caused massive inequality and worsened conditions for the poor (Grilli, 2005). Portes and 
Roberts, in an analysis of several Latin American countries, identified several trends as 
neoliberal policies and changes in urbanization took hold. Specifically, they noted that private 
and export-oriented investment did not trickle-down as expected, but instead caused increased 
unemployment, a rise in the informal sector, and severe economic inequality (Portes and Roberts, 
2005). Lievesley states that neoliberalism resulted in increased poverty and inequality, ―Dashing 
expectations that democracy would bring material security‖ (2009, p. 9). Worsening social 
conditions coupled with a greater ability for citizens to have a voice created the conditions for a 
backlash against privatization and neoliberal policies.    
The new Left in Latin America: 
Dissatisfaction with existing leaders and policies and support for the New Left has caused 
regional changes in the election of political candidates. Democracy has not provided economic 
security or decreased problems viewed as the most important, like unemployment, poverty, and 
inequality (LeoGrande, 2007).  Latin America is the most unequal region in the globe and with 
new democratic and social avenues for power that opened with democracy, citizens are 
demanding change (LeoGrande, 2007). In 1998, the New Left shift began with the election of 
Hugo Chaves in Venezuela (Roberts, 2009). Eight countries, from Nicaragua to Chile, continued 
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the trend and by 2006, close to 60% of the 527 Million people living in Latin America had 
presidents from leftist parties (Arnson, 2007). It is important to note that the trend of the New 
Left is a diverse movement with a range of leaders, goals, and political contexts. In regards to 
New Left governments, Lievesley states, ―they possess a hybrid profile, mixing and matching 
elements of personalism, populism, nationalism, and socialism‖ (2009, p. 24). This section 
defines underlying themes of the New Left and presents the relevant debates in the literature 
including the debate over why the trend has occurred and what this means for Latin America. 
There is diversity within the New Left movement, but similar underlying themes 
represent the movement. The first theme is alteration of the neoliberal economic model that 
brought the free market into Latin America but had devastating results for the poorest citizens. 
The New Left uses state resources and prevents further expansion of neoliberal policies 
(Corrales, 2008). On an economic level, the New Left incorporates socialist ideas of 
redistribution of wealth and pro-poor policies to address the inequality in the region. Even so, the 
New Left is not entirely socialist and blends elements of capitalist and socialist models, giving it 
the name the ―pink tide‖(Whitt, 2010). Corrales (2008) and Baker & Greene (2009) argue that 
the movement is more moderate, and although there have been some reversals of neoliberal 
policies, politicians in the New Left are overall not making extreme economic changes. Another 
theme is movement toward greater state sovereignty and regional control, in contrast to previous 
US intervention in the region (Whitt, 2010). While there are different levels of change, forming a 
more equitable economic model compared with neoliberalism and increased regulation of the 
market and social expenditures are central factors of the New Left.  
More so than previous political shifts in the region, social movements have influenced the 
development of the New Left. The close connection to civil society and grassroots democratic 
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participation forces new governments to recognize social movements and their demands (Whitt, 
2010). Rodríguez-Garavito and Chavez show that, ―contemporary progressive governments go 
beyond the narrow confines of classic modifications of the market economy and representative 
democracy‖ (2008, p.2). They argue that there are new forms of civil society participation with 
the movement, and governments have expanded their agendas that address inequality to include 
issues of ethnicity, gender, and race. Petras and Veltmeyer show that major forces of change for 
the New Left came from the poor, the lower middle class, social movements and trade unions 
(2009). The force of the social movements leads the left to incorporate diverse demands. Even 
so, this thesis will continue to analyze the tangible results that social movements have gained due 
to the left leaning government in Bolivia. Scholars have very different and strong opinions over 
the results and citizens have high expectations, but there is very little quantitative research to 
show the effects of the New Left movement. Analyzing Evo Morales, a New Left leader with a 
unique mandate, will provide a case study for the New Left. This thesis will analyze how 
different groups that contributed to the New Left are benefiting under the new system.  
Although there are several core themes that unite the New Left, the expansion of leftist 
governments is complex and stems from many factors, which leads to a debate over how the 
New Left has gained power. The debate rests on two conflicting theories, the performance theory 
and the policy theory. Baker and Greene (2009) show that these theories provide two 
interpretations for the New Left. The first is the performance theory, which follows traditional 
assumptions that new parties enter into power because previous politicians failed to meet the 
demands of the population (Baker & Greene, 2009). With this theory, failure of right-wing 
politicians in the 1990s to promote growth through market policies (policies that followed the 
neoliberal model) caused voters to elect new politicians to meet their demands. This follows 
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traditional political science reasoning that voters choose to sanction or reward elected officials 
based on their actions while in office. Although actions might include neoliberal policies in this 
case, the focus of the discontent is on the leaders and outcomes, not the broader neoliberal 
policies (Baker & Greene, 2009). 
 Instead of looking at leadership as the reason for change, the policy theory shows that 
larger policy trends have created the dissatisfaction. The policy theory argues that New Left 
governments have a radical mandate to decrease market policies (Baker & Greene, 2009). The 
policy view looks at macroeconomic policies and wide dissatisfaction with the neoliberal model 
to explain the rise of the New Left. It relates to the failure of neoliberalism and the increase in a 
class divide between the rich and the poor. The neoliberal model generated wealth but failed to 
alleviate poverty and inequality and actually worsened these factors in many places (Petras & 
Veltmeyer, 2009). Petras and Veltmeyer (2009) take a Marxist class approach to explain how the 
neoliberal model has contributed to the rise of the New Left. They argue that the political 
movement is a result of competing class forces between the left, which identifies more with the 
working class and socialism, and the right, which favors privatization, businesses, and the 
neoliberal model. In this argument, the lower classes, which were already deeply affected by a 
history of dictatorships and discrimination, were further hurt by neoliberal reforms and chose to 
organize, use alternate methods to pressure the state, and contribute to the rise of the New Left 
(Petras & Veltmeyer, 2009).  The policy framework and a class approach provide one reason 
why the New Left has emerged.  
Baker and Greene in their analysis of public opinion data in 18 countries found an 
alternate view. They argue that the radical policy or the performance theories do not provide the 
answer and instead voters have granted a moderate policy mandate. They state, ―a vote for the 
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia 27 
 
left is not simply an expression of anti-incumbency but does contain policy-driven content‖ 
(Baker & Greene, 2009, p. 10). Elements of the policy theory are included but not as extreme, 
and the performance theory is discounted as the primary explanation. Although there is a debate 
regarding the policy and performance theories, it is possible that both aspects play a role in the 
rise of the new left, in addition to other factors.  
Beyond the policy and performance theories, diverse groups and US intervention are 
additional factors that have affected the New Left. Corrales (2008) argues that groups with 
various interests within the New Left movement have different motivations and goals but are 
united in their desire for change. Different groups include radicals who want major changes, 
protectionists who want to regain state trade control, nationalists who object to US intervention, 
progressives for increased social spending, access to the market, or pro-poor reforms, as well as 
multicultural and feminist groups who want to address inequality (Corrales, 2008). Beasley-
Murray et al. (2009) agree with this stance, stating, ―The left turns are best described as a 
multiplicity of disparate efforts to reopen or re-found the constitutional order or social pact‖ (p. 
319). They also see the New Left as a diverse movement with different groups and goals. Both 
Arditi and Petras also acknowledge the role of the US in the rise of the New Left. Arditi (2008) 
shows that post 9/11, US priorities shifted away from Latin America. Petras and Veltmeyer 
(2009) argue that the US currently has less power to dictate policy and exert power in Latin 
America. Overall, many additional factors such as diverse demands and decreased US 
involvement have also shaped the rise of the New Left.  
 Scholars have many different perspectives on why the New Left has taken hold, but the 
basic idea of discontent with the status quo underlies each argument. Although many papers use 
quantitative measures, the majority use speculation or broad analysis to draw conclusions. This 
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paper furthers the argument by providing a new perspective with quantitative analysis of Bolivia. 
This thesis will contribute to the debate through analysis of Bolivia because it is a part of the 
broader movement, but has specific factors such as high indigenous presence and large 
mobilization of social groups that make it a particularly interesting case to discuss the New Left.  
With the general trend to the left in Latin America, there are many opinions over what 
this political shift means for Latin America and policymakers in Washington. Scholars disagree 
on how to classify and view countries. These perspectives are important, especially in the US, 
because opinions factor into foreign policy decisions. On one side, scholars like Castañeda place 
countries in either radical or moderate positions. He identifies four shades of the Latin American 
Left: communist, social democrat, Castroist, and Political-Military, but he argues that social 
democrat position is the only acceptable way to develop (Castañeda, 2006). Venezuela‘s Hugo 
Chavez, in 1998, became the first radical leader elected, but Bolivia and Ecuador are also placed 
in this category because of their goals to transform institutions instead of work within them. 
More moderate countries like Chile, Brazil and Uruguay follow a reformist ideology; they want 
new policies that focus on social welfare but continue to support current institutions (Castañeda, 
2006).   
The other side of the debate challenges Castañeda, stating that there are multiple paths to 
develop and reasons behind the levels of radical behavior in Latin America. Sandbrook et al. 
observes three types of social democracy: radical, classical and third way, and argues that all are 
options for development (Sandbrook et al, 2007). Schamis acknowledges movement forward 
through distinguishing between types of the New Left but challenges Castañeda‘s classification 
stating, ―Further differentiation is needed to account for the various lefts that have emerged in 
Latin America‘s recent past‖ (Schamis, 2006, p. 22).  Schamis recognizes that the countries who 
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seek to reform within institutions, termed ―social democrats‖ by Castañeda, have functional and 
credible institutions, while those who want to re-create the system, or ―radicals,‖ have had 
problems with exclusion and corruption in the existing institutions (Schamis, 2006). The 
democratic context affects politicians‘ ability to work within the existing system.  
The debate over New Left classification extends to the idea of populism, scholars present 
different views on the actual results and contributions of New Left leaders often termed 
―populist‖ leaders. Lievesley questions the term populism, stating that the negative and 
emotional connotations with the term are often used to place New Left leaders in a category 
without analyzing the use or context of the word (2009). Even so, populism is a much-discussed 
topic of the New Left. Populism is associated with charismatic leaders who use direct gestures to 
the masses that may be deceptive. Along those lines, Beasley-Murray et al. questions if these 
leaders can move from, ―bombastic rhetoric and diplomatic grandstanding into specific policies 
and sustainable programs and concrete results….within a renewed commitment to a more 
meaningful understanding of democratic politics‖ (Beasley-Murray et al., 2009, p. 320).  
Populist rhetoric and its negative connotation complicate the discussion of the New Left.  
Moving past broad categories to the Bolivian case, the debate continues. Bolivia is 
connected to the broader movement of the new Left and often associated with the radical left, but 
there are also factors that make the Bolivian case unique. In the Bolivian New Left debate, 
scholars view Morales as everything from a radical to a soft moderate who has not made 
substantial changes.  Castañeda argues that Morales is a radical who only hopes to gain more 
power and claims that he is actually providing the poor with very little and simply using his 
indigenous heritage to gain popularity (2006). Alternatively, Petras and Veltmeyer (2009) argue 
that Morales has taken a moderate position in practice. They state that with two years in power, 
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dramatic changes benefiting the poor have not occurred, and Morales has actually favored 
investors in the agro-mineral export industries. Although agricultural reform and nationalization 
of the gas industries were two policy steps, they argue that very little land distribution has been 
implemented and that de facto control of the natural gas industry remains with multinationals 
(Petras & Veltmeyer, 2009). Postero argues that the government is beginning to institutionalize 
its agenda, which might show that Morales is interested in implementation, not just popular 
rhetoric (2010). Overall, there are many contradictions and perspectives on the Bolivian 
government‘s policies. This thesis moves past rhetoric and broad categories and looks at the 
contributions of Evo Morales to different sectors of society. It will further analysis of the New 
Left by providing new insight into this case with a quantitative model.  
Conclusion: 
 The New Left stems from a variety of economic and political changes that occurred 
during the twentieth century. The rise and fall of revolutionary movements created a need for a 
different type of change within the existing system, while crisis in the 1980s and resulting 
economic changes lowered the quality of life for many and fuelled a drive for a change in the 
status quo. The New Left is pervasive throughout Latin America, but there are differences 
between countries. Additionally, there are differences in the outlook and classification of New 
Left governments. Some see the New Left as a radical threat, while others recognize it as a 
legitimate path towards development. The larger context of Latin America is important when 
understanding government responsiveness in Bolivia because larger trends affect Evo Morales‘ 
actions and macro-level constraints. The next chapter will build on the ideas presented, 
especially the economic and social changes that occurred from 1960-1990, but will take a closer 
look at the unique case of Bolivia in regards to indigenous politics. 
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Chapter Three: The Roots of Indigenous Politics in Bolivia and MAS  
After setting up the regional context that affects Bolivia in chapter two, chapter three will 
show how broader changes have affected Bolivian politics and indigenous organization. This 
chapter will cover the development of the indigenous political movement in Bolivia, which is 
essential to understand the context of Bolivia and the leadership of Evo Morales. Evo Morales 
blends indigenismo, sindicalismo, and nationalism. Indigenismo represents indigenous politics, 
while the collective style of governance seen in the Bolivian highlands through the sindicato 
system of land control affects how the new government perceives its role and the way that it 
executes policy. Given the strong connection between Evo Morales leadership and the roots of 
the indigenous movement, indigenous ideas are crucial to understanding government 
responsiveness in Bolivia. The development of a strong indigenous political voice stems from the 
combination of indigenous values and identity, historic marginalization and poverty, and the 
Bolivian constitutional changes. This chapter will outline the history behind indigenous 
marginalization and constitutional changes, as well as their effect on Bolivian politics. 
Spanish Colonial Legacy and Indigenous Marginalization: 
To understand the current situation in Bolivia, it is important to see how the colonial 
legacy has created a divide between poor, indigenous people and a rich, ruling elite. In 1525, 
Spain conquered the territory now known as Bolivia because of the opportunity for wealth 
through silver mines (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009). Resistance to Spanish control 
grew over time and, in the early 1800s, Bolivia declared its independence.  It did not officially 
break free from Spain until 1825 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009). In the absence of 
the Spanish monarchy‘s control, the lack of infrastructure and process of nation building proved 
difficult for Bolivia‘s elites. The country experienced some periods of stability when commodity 
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prices were high, but its political history continued to be marked with elite-led coups, violence, 
and corruption in the government until 1982 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009).   
The most lasting impact of Spanish colonialism was inequality between populations, 
which resulted in uneven development. The poor and marginalized indigenous groups worked in 
the mines and haciendas but did not have access to education or suffrage, while the powerful 
populations of European decent controlled the political and economic sectors of Bolivia and 
gained from commodity exports like silver and tin (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009). 
The Spanish control and exploitation of natural resources and indigenous people caused uneven 
development because wealth and power was concentrated in the hands of the elite. This history 
of colonialism continues to affect the power balance in Bolivia because populations of European 
descent that formed the small elite historically have had more political, economic, and social 
power. 
The historic marginalization is significant because of the high numbers and diversity of 
indigenous groups in Bolivia. There are over thirty-four Amerindian languages spoken in 
Bolivia, and a majority of the population speaks one of these languages as their native tongue 
(Gustafson, 2002). The Aymara and Quechua groups from the highlands are the largest groups, 
but there are many others. In the 1990 Census, indigenous people from the lowlands were 
referred to as ―savages,‖ which illustrates the perception of indigenous groups even at this time 
(Gustafson, 2002). From the era of Spanish colonization, Indigenous groups‘ exclusion from 
politics affected their ability to enact change, but their recent mobilizations are beginning to alter 
the system. 
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Constitutional Changes and Indigenous Politics: 
There are two major institutional changes which have altered Bolivia‘s political climate 
and created the framework and drive for indigenous mobilization. The first was the Revolution 
of 1952, which increased indigenous autonomy and the second, neoliberal changes in the 1980s 
and 1990s, which threatened the autonomy of groups, but also increased the recognition of 
indigenous rights. Indigenous autonomy, or the ability of indigenous groups to govern 
themselves at the local level, developed after the revolution because of the sindicato system of 
rural unions (Selbin, 1999). With a strong central government that largely excluded the rural 
indigenous groups, the sindicato system formed a parallel system of governing outside of the 
state. Neoliberal changes threatened this structure with the Law of Popular Participation in 1994 
because the decentralization of power fragmented the leadership of national union system and 
decreased sindicatos’ control at the local level. At the same time, it created formal channels for 
indigenous and social movements to participate in the government (Gustafson, 2002). The 
development of sindicatos contributed to the framework for strong indigenous organization and 
the neoliberal changes furthered indigenous groups‘ ability to participate in government. 
Yashar‘s framework will further the discussion of how the two structural changes affected 
indigenous movements. 
Yashar (1999), in an influential article, argues that two institutional changes have spurred 
the mobilization of indigenous groups. In her argument, the two ways institutions organize the 
rights of citizens and their channels for dialogue with the government, termed ―citizenship 
regimes,‖ are the corporatist and neoliberal models (1999). In Latin America, the corporatist 
model centralized the government, provided state-sponsored social programs, and defined 
organizations that mediated between individuals and the government. To incorporate indigenous 
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groups, this structure brought them into the system as peasants and created organizations for 
them based on class, not indigenous identity. This unintentionally allowed for local autonomy of 
indigenous groups through collective organization and local leadership. On the other hand, the 
neoliberal model decentralized government control, expanded individual rights, privatized land, 
and discontinued social programs. Governments attempted to increase individual rights by 
opening new avenues for participation, but could not guarantee individual rights, and 
undermined the leverage of community organizations. For example, increased emphasis on 
property rights undermined the collective ownership of land that many indigenous groups had 
worked with since the revolution. Yashar argues the threat to the indigenous community 
structure has catalyzed the indigenous movement (1999). This threat to both livelihood and 
organization provided the need to organize, and the decentralized government system provided 
new opportunities for political participation.  
 Following Yashar‘s model, the Revolution of 1952 set up the corporatist model in Bolivia 
because it created centralized institutions and allowed for indigenous autonomy. Selbin argues 
that the Bolivian Revolution was an incomplete and failed revolution because it successfully 
institutionalized its agenda but did not achieve consolidation (1999). The lack of consolidation, 
defined as the empowerment and commitment of the Bolivian populous to the revolution, limited 
the success, but the institutions provided a foundation for indigenous autonomy through land 
reform. Prior to the revolution, a rich elite controlled large land tracts, called haciendas, while 
the majority of rural indigenous peasants worked the land in horrible conditions (Selbin, 1999). 
Agrarian reform redistributed land and organized it into sindicatos or rural unions (Selbin, 1999). 
The sindicato system resulted in autonomy for indigenous groups because there was local 
leadership and collective control of the land. In Bolivia, the sindicato system incorporated 
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elements of European style syndicalism from labor unions but also included characteristics of the 
ayllu system of land holding, which was based on kinship networks and the idea of reciprocity 
within a community (Van Cott, 2003; Stephenson, 2002). Conzelman explains that the sindicato 
system formed the central community base after the hacienda system, and it developed into, ―a 
structure for rural community-based democracy and indigenous political participation in Bolivian 
politics‖ (2008, p. 6). The sindicato system created a network for rural agricultural workers, 
incorporated traditionally indigenous ayllu elements, and provided a framework for local 
democracy and participation. 
Another important legacy of the revolution was the formation of the COB 
(Confederacion Obrera Boliviana) in 1952, but its position changed dramatically with neoliberal 
reforms. The COB was a workers union federation that united diverse sectors of society. It 
relates to the corporatist model because it mediated between the population and the government. 
Just after the 1952 revolution, it co-governed with the MNR and had veto power over political 
policy (Kohl & Farthing, 2006). The union‘s power continued and it was involved in major 
political transitions, such as the end of the Banzer dictatorship in 1978 and the beginning of 
democracy in Bolivia. The COB maintained its unity and strength until the 1980s, when 
neoliberal reforms took hold.  
The shift to the neoliberal model, as Yashar describes, had direct consequences to both 
the COB and the indigenous movement. In 1985, Jeffery Sachs and the Bolivian Minister of 
Planning implemented the neoliberal agenda in Bolivia as a part of structural adjustment 
programs and called it, ―The New Economic Policy,‖ (La Botz, 2007).  It promoted some 
economic growth and stabilized inflation by 1987, but it caused drastic changes in the real 
interest rates, overvaluation, and paradoxically, increased debt by the late 1990s (Easterly, 2002).  
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Additionally, privatization of the mining industry caused major cuts and eliminated 23,000 jobs 
(Farthing & Kohl, 2001). Even more devastating, the lost jobs hurt the leadership and 
organization of the COB, which had united resistance to the central government from all sectors 
of society. The COB went from being one of the strongest labor movements in Latin America to 
a less effective organization that no longer brought the sectors together, but instead took on small 
fragmented projects with little leadership (Farthing & Kohl, 2001). However, the decline of the 
COB had further effects on indigenous organization as other unions came to the forefront. 
The decline of the COB fragmented organizations but allowed for indigenous leadership 
in the CSUTCB (Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) to 
organize over specific indigenous issues. Before the loss of COB‘s power, the CSUTCB tried to 
shift the focus of the organization to represent campesinos, instead of prioritizing workers, but 
they were unsuccessful (Kohl & Farthing, 2006). Closing mines hurt the major leadership and 
organization of the COB, but it allowed the CSUTCB to have an independent voice and lead the 
indigenous movement. Today, it is the most important organization associated with indigenous 
action (Gustafson, 2002). The CSUTCB is localized in the Andean region and is related to 
syndicalism (Gustafson, 2002). It represents non-indigenous groups also but is predominantly 
associated with Quechua and Aymara groups. Its major issues revolve around agriculture, 
autonomy, education, and water rights (Gustafson, 2002). Through the central government, the 
CSUTCB had control and autonomy, which unintentionally organized indigenous groups and 
created a system of leadership.  
Another key indigenous organization is the CIDOB (Confederacion Indigena de Bolivia), 
which developed as international indigenous organizations gained momentum in the 1980s and 
1990s. The CIDOB is located in the lowlands and has developed more recently from indigenous 
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movements in the 1980‘s. Its major issues are natural resources and political participation 
(Gustafson, 2002). The increase in indigenous organization and action through CIDOB and 
CSUTCB elicited a government response to recognize and make constitutional changes for 
indigenous rights (Gustafson, 2002). In 1994, the Bolivian Constitution changed to state that 
Bolivia was a ―multiethnic and pluricultural‖ nation, and the Ministry of Ethnic and Indigenous 
Affairs was created (Gustafson, 2002).  
Although the constitutional acknowledgement of indigenous groups was important, the 
Law of Popular Participation (LPP) in 1994 was the most influential structural change for 
indigenous movements and democracy in Bolivia. The LPP influenced indigenous groups by 
decentralizing control to the municipal level. This law changed the distribution of national funds 
because it allocated twenty percent of national tax revenue to municipalities and transferred 
ownership of health, education, and other infrastructure from the national to the municipal 
governments (Faguet, 2009). It also expanded the number of municipalities and gave 
municipalities the responsibility of annual and five-year plans for development. The LPP 
changed the structure of the Bolivian government, giving municipalities a greater role in the 
process. 
Although it localized control, the LPP also threatened the strong indigenous 
organizations. By bringing the government to a local level, sindicato organizations were no 
longer autonomous and lost much of their power (Yashar, 1999). The LPP changed the political 
structure and shifted power away from highly centralized unions that had mediated between the 
government and citizens. On the other hand, Van Cott argues that the LPP‘s decentralization 
allowed indigenous groups to take part in the national political system because electoral changes 
allowed small parties with specific geographic support to gain seats in the national legislature 
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(2003). Munoz-Pogossian shows that constitutional changes have expanded the system, 
represented by the emergence of over 400 political parties and 500 indigenous and civil 
associations in the last 20 years (2008). The changes to the system have threatened autonomy, 
therefore mobilizing indigenous groups, but also have created new avenues by which they can 
participate in national politics. 
The LPP opened up several avenues for government and nongovernmental involvement, 
increased local participation, and integrated local organizations in new ways. One major effect 
was further collaboration between municipalities and various types of NGOs because NGOs 
could provide resources and support to small municipalities, specifically with writing and 
implementing the development plans (Kohl, 2003). NGOs were already active in Bolivia; they 
had mediated between political parties and communities and had initiated development projects 
since the 1970s (Kohl & Farthing, 2006). Even so, the decentralization expanded the NGOs‘ role 
in Bolivia.  Kohl also cites the importance of the Grassroots Territorial Organizations for local 
organization (GTO or OTB) that registered with the government after the LPP and took on 
development projects, mobilized communities, and provided public works (2003). Moreover, 
between three and ten members from local GTOs formed Oversight Committees or Comités de 
Vigilancia. The OCs have veto power over municipal budgets and budget reports to guarantee 
proper spending and decrease local corruption (Kohl, 2003). This gave further power to 
communities, but Kohl also notes that it created a gender gap because men dominated the 
leadership of existing organizations and the GTOs did not provide new avenues for women 
(Kohl, 2003).  Overall, the LPP increased local power through association with NGOs and the 
creation of GTOs and OCs. 
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Massive Mobilization: Protest in the Public Sphere 
 Indigenous mobilization in Bolivia has created a vibrant and active civil society that 
pressures governments that refuse to acknowledge their demands. Between 2000 and 2005, 
Bolivia went through a period of instability. During this time, civil society actively engaged the 
state because groups found the state unresponsive to their demands. In each case of protest, 
groups demanded procedural justice for greater participation and management of natural 
resources and a more equal distribution of the resources (Perreault, 2006). The active 
participation and protest frames the context of Bolivian government responsiveness. Road 
blockades or bloqueos are one method used to pressure the government directly. Conzelman 
explains, ―Participating in a protest or bloqueo is a sacrifice of individual time and energy for 
collective goals, and has been for decades an important vehicle for the insertion of an indigenous 
voice into national politics‖ (2008, p.7). Bloqueos can have negative effects to the regional 
economy, but they provide an alternative sphere for indigenous groups to voice demands, 
organize groups around collective goals, gain the attention of the media, and cause government 
officials to negotiate (Conzelman, 2008). These cases further illustrate that the government has 
refused to respond to demands until citizens have used direct pressure. The precedent for how 
and when the Bolivian government responds to the people is important to the factors that may 
contribute to government responsiveness in Bolivia.  
Huge governmental protest in the Cochabamba Water War represents the force of 
indigenous and popular organization in Bolivia and the effect of structural reforms on grassroots 
participation.  The Water Wars were massive protests in response to the government allowing 
Bechtel to privatize water. The deal between the corporation and President Banzer increased 
water prices 200% and provided the catalyst for huge mobilization (Farthing & Kohl, 2001).  In 
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1999, a town hall meeting and protest over the issue attracted over 10,000 people (Kohl & 
Farthing, 2006). The town hall meeting organized demands and mobilization at the grassroots 
level. Additionally, the protests empowered Bolivian citizens because they were the leaders of 
this movement. Although it was a lengthy process, the protests also succeeded in their aims. 
Banzer‘s government cancelled the contract and stated that the social movements would have a 
larger role in the water oversight (Perreault, 2006). 
Also in 2000, both the CIDOB and the CSUTCB organized in the name of indigenous 
demands and protested the government. Aymara farmer‘s unions caused roadblocks into La Paz 
(Gustafson, 2002). These blockades opposed an agrarian reform law and a law that would 
partially privatize water nationally (Farthing & Kohl, 2001). Led by the indigenous leader Felipe 
Quispe, CSUTCB roadblocks shut off La Paz for weeks. Meanwhile, Evo Morales led the 
CIDOB with roadblocks and blockades on the Chapare‘s connecting road between Santa Cruz 
and Cochabamba (Farthing & Kohl, 2001). The protesters maintained peace, but there was some 
violence by the government. Mounting protests led President Banzer to declare a three-month 
stage of siege. Afterwards, additional groups like teachers and the COB also went on strike to 
join the protests (Farthing & Kohl, 2001). Eventually, the government agreed to the CSUTCBs 
demands including reform on water, land, natural resources, and labor laws. The unprecedented 
level of mobilization and success of the movement had lasting implications for Bolivia. Overall, 
the resistance has changed the power structure from the previous vertical union system to a 
grassroots structure that revolves around certain groups with specific goals (Farthing & Kohl, 
2001).  
In 2003, protest erupted again in the Andean regions over a plan to export gas through a 
Chilean port, called the Gas War. Transnational corporations would have received the majority 
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of the gains through the export and sale of Bolivia‘s resources. Military violence in response to 
the protests radicalized the movement and brought people from different groups into the protests. 
The massive roadblocks began in a largely indigenous city, El Alto, but mobilization, marches, 
and hunger strikes spread to other cities. The broader issues of resource allocation and 
distribution of resource wealth were at the heart of the gas wars and became national issues for 
Bolivians (Perreault, 2006). The gas war resulted in the president, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 
resigning. Overall, the Gas War symbolizes Bolivian‘s discontent with the current distribution 
and planning of natural resources as well as their ability to organize and pressure the government 
through social mobilization.  
The Rise of MAS and Evo Morales: 
The organization of the sindicato system of coca growers directly relates to the 
emergence of MAS. The party began from the cocalero union of coca growers (Dominguez, 
2009). The cocalero unions were founded in the sindicato organization around Cochabamba, but 
they expanded with decentralization in 1994 because the unions were able to participate formally 
in municipalities as Grassroots Territorial Organizations (OTBs) (Conzelman, 2008; Kohl, 
2003). The movement also gained strength after US policy affected the livelihood of many 
indigenous coca farmers. The US forced eradication of coca because they identified coca 
growers as narco-terrorists (Postero, 2010). The coca growers relied on the crop for their 
livelihood and saw the coca leaf as a sacred herbal plant, not as a drug. As a result of anti-coca 
policies supported by the US government, cocaleros initiated protests and blocked routes 
between La Paz and Santa Cruz (Gustafson, 2002).  
The organization of coca-growers in the Chapare region eventually formed a political 
group. The party began as the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Political 
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Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples—IPSP), but later took the name of an established 
political party MAS (Postero, 2010). The party had a diverse base and a new style of 
organization that was bottom-up rather than top-down.  This practice stems from the sindicato 
system of local democracy that infused syndicalism labor ideas, such as transparency, 
accountability, and regular assembly, with Andean tradition (Conzelman, 2008). MAS rose with 
social movements and became a party that represented indigenous and lower class much more 
than the elite that traditionally had ruled Bolivia. With the electoral changes in 1994, MAS was 
able to capitalize on the new grassroots expansion and rise to the national government. 
Beginning with local elections in 1995 and then congressional seats in 1997, MAS transitioned 
into the political sphere.  
The social movements and cocaleros also influenced the politics and ideology of Evo 
Morales. As a cocalero himself, Morales gained his leadership through the sindicato system. 
Now in office, the lessons and experiences that shaped his development continue to shape his 
leadership. Instead of the top-down leadership that characterizes most presidencies, Morales 
wants to represent the demands of the people and social movements (Dunkerley, 2007). This 
view of his role stems from indigenous characteristics of direct democracy and the integrated 
participation of different individuals in the sindicato system. Additionally, he argues for 
―Andean socialism,‖ a more equitable economic model that blends capitalism and socialism to 
provide for community development (Conzelman, 2008).  
Dunkerley argues that Morales‘ leadership is plebian in nature, because his presidency 
represents the masses and brings in their ideas of governance.  Dunkerley states, ―He has cut his 
salary, abstained from alcohol, worked absurdly long hours, and shared the presidential residence 
with members of his cabinet‖ (2006, p. 165). Another way that he represents the masses is 
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through his connection to indigenous ideas. Morales indigenous heritage is represented in his 
rhetoric. He speaks of indigenous empowerment and rebuilding the nation (Postero, 2010). 
Following the grassroots model, he wants indigenous autonomy and locally organized 
development (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2009). Overall, because of Morales beginnings in the 
sindicato system, he has a different view of his role as president. This role may cause him to be 
more responsive to the needs of his constituents, since he claims to see himself as an 
intermediary and focuses on listening to his constituents. 
Although Morales has a different role, he faces many constraints as the president of 
Bolivia. The distribution of resources is an ongoing battle, because large-scale export producers 
from departments such as Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Pando believe that they are entitled to the 
wealth, while other poor subsistence and small-scale farmers demand a shift in allocation. This 
has led to conflict and threats of secession.  In 2007, Santa Cruz passed a referendum for 
autonomy and full control of their resources. The government declared the referendum illegal, 
but it led to another national referendum on the Presidency of Evo Morales. Morales took 
advantage of the discontent, turned the referendum into a popular consultation to evaluate his 
mandate, and won 67.8% of the vote (Petras &Veltmeyer, 2009). However, the right-wing 
producers continue to influence his goals and threaten the stability of the government. The large 
Santa Cruz landowners, for example, have been able to stall the government‘s political project 
(Petras &Veltmeyer, 2009). Ultimately, Morales has the difficult task of maintaining a certain 
level of national unity while demands from his base push him one direction and firm opposition 
complicates the political arena and prevents many changes.  
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Conclusion: 
Overall, the development of strong indigenous groups has impacted the rise of MAS and 
the leadership of Evo Morales. The legacy of Spanish colonialism continues to affect the 
political and economic situation in Bolivia. Historic indigenous marginalization combined with 
institutional changes prompted the indigenous mobilization. Applying Yashar‘s framework to 
recent events also provides a more cohesive explanation for how institutional changes impacted 
indigenous politics. The corporatist model centralized the government allowing for indigenous 
autonomy, while the neoliberal model threatened autonomy but allowed for new ways to 
participate. This had a two-fold impact, providing a need for indigenous groups to mobilize to 
protect their autonomy and opportunities to use the existing system to make those changes. 
Constitutional changes like the Law of Popular Participation and recognition of indigenous 
groups also expanded their reach. Lastly, the changes led to the formation of MAS and allowed 
for its increased popularity. Indigenous heritage is a large part of MAS and Evo Morales‘ 
perspective and forms many of their goals. Their untraditional style of governance is flexible and 
rooted in their base.  Moreover, their sense of responsibility and accountability is also affected 
by their indigenous and syndicalism traditions because these structures influenced their 
leadership development. Although this affects their policy decisions, opposition presents a 
challenge to the leadership and makes broad changes more difficult. 
 The complex political arena in Bolivia presents an interesting case study of government 
responsiveness. The new government of Evo Morales follows several governments that were 
unresponsive to the people until massive protest forced them out of office. The institutions and 
developing character of Bolivian democracy presents many constraints. On the other hand, the 
unique style of leadership and broad mandate may cause Evo Morales to respond to his base. 
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Either way, the results have implications for the study of Bolivia and democratic responsiveness. 
Evaluating the actual contributions of MAS and Evo Morales to their base furthers the discussion 
and allows for a new perspective on the issue.  
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Chapter Four: Theory to be Tested 
The current literature on government responsiveness fails to reach a consensus over how 
and why politicians distribute goods and services. This thesis examined the conditions that lead 
politicians in developing democracies to fulfill their mandates to the poor by increasing transfers 
to local governments. The relevant literature on theories of government responsiveness, the New 
Left in Latin America, and perspectives on Evo Morales‘ policy and actions as president 
provided the basis for the statistical analysis. This paper addressed the swing vote or core 
supporter theories of targeted spending, as well as the electoral and participatory theories on 
government accountability.   
The first hypothesis analyzed targeted spending to see if it aligns with the swing vote or 
the core supporter theory. The swing vote theory argues that politicians will target spending into 
competitive areas or areas where they do not receive high levels of support in order to widen 
their base of support (Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003). Following this logic, if the swing vote 
theory holds, then the politician would raise transfers for areas that had a close margin or 
increased votes for the opponent.  Alternatively, the core supporter theory argues that politicians 
will target spending into areas where support was high in order to maintain their foundation 
(Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2003). In this case, if the elected politician followed the core 
supporter theory, then increased transfers would go to areas that show high vote shares for that 
politician. This debate sets up two conflicting hypotheses. To test the hypotheses, the vote share 
was the independent variable. The dependent variable was the amount of government spending, 
measured by federal transfers to local governments. The first hypothesis tested whether 
government spending is being targeted to specific groups following the core or swing vote 
theories. 
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H1: A large vote share for the politician in power will be associated with increased 
transfers to swing voters. 
(Alternate) H2: A large vote share for the politician in power will be associated with 
increased transfers to core supporters. 
In the Bolivian case, the first hypothesis, following the swing voter theory, is more likely 
because of constraints that Evo Morales faces as president. His base shows high support and 
created a mandate for him through the election, but unsupportive regions are causing instability. 
If Morales wants to maintain power, an investment to swing voters is likely to yield more 
political gains. Transfers to his supporters, which are unlikely to lose support in the short term, 
will cause less political gains. Given the likely political gains by increasing transfers more to 
areas that are not currently in favor of Morales, he is more likely to follow the swing vote theory. 
A second hypothesis tested whether sanction by voting or direct pressure influences 
government responsiveness to highlight the electoral and participation theories. The electoral 
theory argues that responsiveness occurs through elections because voters can penalize or reward 
politicians for meeting their demands (Cleary, 2007). If the electoral theory holds, then the 
elected politician should increase spending where there was a close margin of victory, indicating 
competitive elections. Another option, the participation theory, argues that pressure outside of 
elections, such as organization, protest, or high involvement are more effective in causing 
government responsiveness (Cleary, 2007). If the participation theory holds, then places with 
social mobilization, high voter turnout and participation, and increased association through 
NGOs will show higher government transfers. This set up two additional hypotheses. Similar to 
the first hypothesis, the dependent variable was government transfers to local municipalities. The 
independent variables in this case were vote share for the politician and competition in elections 
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to test the electoral theory, and voter turnout and NGO activity to test the participation theory. 
The following hypotheses illustrate the two theories: 
H3: Indicators of political participation, such as NGO activity and voter turnout, will 
be associated with increases in government transfers. 
H4: Indicators of electoral competition will be associated with increased governmental 
transfers.   
The third hypothesis is more likely than the fourth in the Bolivian case because of a 
tradition of high mobilization and pressure outside of elections to gain political action. As 
illustrated through the Gas War and the Water War, Bolivians are willing to pressure the 
government through roadblocks and protest and have been successful in pressuring leaders who 
do not respond to their demands (Kohl & Farthing, 2006). Boulding showed evidence that 
populations in weak democracies are more likely to gain from radical measures of participation 
because the state can be unresponsive to their demands through more moderate means, such as 
elections (2010). She also found that NGOs facilitate collective action and participation in 
Bolivia (Boulding, 2010). The existing networks of organization and the history of protest as the 
only ways to gain change support the participation theory for government responsiveness. 
However, the fourth hypothesis is also included because of the precedence and potential for 
competition as a factor of government responsiveness.   
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Chapter Five: Methods 
This chapter includes the methods and research design to address the hypotheses and 
analyze the research question: what conditions lead politicians in developing democracies to 
fulfill their mandates to the poor by increasing transfers to local governments? This thesis uses 
quantitative data to measure government responsiveness in the Bolivian case. This chapter 
explains the relevance of studying the Bolivian case, information about the dataset, the models 
used to test government responsiveness, and explanation of key variables and controls. 
The Bolivian Case: 
 Bolivia is an especially relevant case to the current understanding of democracy and 
government responsiveness because it is a part of the New Left context, it is a developing 
democracy, and because recent political changes define a unique mandate for change. The New 
Left is a hot topic in current research and there is a large debate over what the trend means and 
how it might affect millions in Latin America. Although there is increased study of the topic, 
there is almost no quantitative data to support the arguments and conclusions on the New Left. 
Bolivia is a central nation in the debate and the sub-national data will allow quantitative analysis 
of government responsiveness that can be applied to the broader discussion of the New Left.  
The Bolivian case provides further value because it is a developing democracy. The 
history of corruption and political problems coupled with the mandate for new governance that 
represents the interests of the people will provide insight into problems as well as possible 
solutions concerning government responsiveness in democratizing nations. With many 
democratizing countries worldwide facing similar constraints this case will help further the 
discussion of democratic responsiveness.  
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The Bolivian case is also remarkable because of the historical changes that took place in 
2005, with the election of the first indigenous president. The elite dominated politics in Bolivia 
for hundreds of years. Only in 1994, with the Law of Popular Participation, did avenues to 
political participation open in Bolivia to diverse groups, such as the poor and indigenous, who 
had previously been marginalized (Faguet, 2009). The structural changes, social mobilization, 
and broad government dissatisfaction leading to the election of Evo Morales has implications for 
the study of democracy. Evo Morales has a unique mandate to the poor populations of Bolivia 
and his base has specific and far-reaching demands for his administration.  
Data Source: 
The data was collected from the Bolivian governmental website Fichas Municipales 
Autonomia: http://obd.autonomia.gob.bo/municipal/fichas/index.php. This website records data 
on financial, social, development indicators, and political information for each municipality. This 
particular data set consisted of financial data and social data from 2001-2009.  The financial data 
included breakdown of municipal income, transfers from the federal government, and  
categorization of spending by sector (social, energy, etc.). The social data included a wide range 
of health and education indicators at the municipal level including vaccination rates and 
education enrollment. Census and election data from a previously compiled dataset were also 
included (Boulding, 2010). Census figures included indigenous, rural, and population indicators 
and election data had the results, vote shares, and measures of competition from the 1999, 2004 
and 2005 elections.  
Data collection: 
An original data set was compiled for this thesis. The process data collection began with 
copying and pasting the original tables into an excel file. The data was then organized into two 
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master spreadsheets, one for social and one for financial.  A random check of numbers showed 
that there were no major errors in the master data set. Additions to the dataset, including census 
and election measures, were merged in Stata.  
Data Concerns and Limitations: 
Some variables were concerning because of a high number of zeros. After further 
analysis of the location of zeros it was determined that they were visible across all regions and 
that the random numbers would not affect the overall data set for the variables used. Variables 
with a question of accuracy due to excess zeros were not included in the regression models. It 
was not known why the zeros were present; municipalities might not have had information 
available at the time of data collection to include it in the updated version, or they might have 
had trouble collecting data in the early 2000s. 
Data Research and Design: 
The hypotheses were tested using an original dataset on financial data, census indicators, 
election results, and social spending data. Data provides empirical evidence to add to the debate 
and provide further information to other studies that either chose different methods or did not 
arrive at definitive conclusions with their results. The dataset was used to test whether sanction 
by voting or direct pressure influences government responsiveness and to see where government 
spending is being targeted. Through Stata, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to 
estimate coefficients of interest. OLS produces a line of best fit that minimizes the sum of the 
squared vertical distances from the line to the observed data points. It uses the sum of squared 
distances to estimate the true relationship between two variables. Robust standard errors were 
used to correct for non-constant standard deviations of the variables. 
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There were two models of the regression to test the effect of vote share for Evo Morales 
on average federal transfers to municipalities. The first hypothesis stated that a large vote share 
for the politician in power would be associated with increased transfers to swing voters. The 
third hypothesis stated that indicators of political participation, such as NGO activity and voter 
turnout, would be associated with increases in government transfers. The fourth stated that 
indicators of electoral competition would be associated with increased governmental transfers.  
The first model used the difference in the average total transfers (including IDH, CPP, and 
HIPC) between 2001-2004 and 2005-2009 as the dependent variable. This measured the change 
in transfers specifically under the Morales administration. The second model used the difference 
in the average transfers without including the IDH transfer as the dependent variable. This 
control assured that observed differences in the total transfers were not solely because of 
increased funds being targeted to oil producing regions, which was expected to a certain degree 
with the IDH transfer. The second set of models (3-4), used the previous independent and 
dependent variables but included extra controls to show that extraneous variables were not 
affecting the regression.  
Model 1: Change in total average transfers= β0+ β1 (Vote share for Evo Morales) + β2 
(% Electricity) + β3 (Logged Population) + β4 (Population Density) + β5 (% Indigenous) 
+ β6 (% Rural) + β7 (Total NGOs) + β8 (Voter Turnout) + ε 
 
Model 2: Change in average CPP and HIPC transfers= β0+ β1 (Vote share for Evo 
Morales) + β2 (% Electricity) + β3 (Logged Population) + β4 (Population Density) + β5 
(% Indigenous) + β6 (% Rural) + β7 (Total NGOs) + β8 (Voter Turnout) + ε 
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For further support of the hypothesis, additional controls were added to the first two 
models. The third model represents additional controls using the dependent variable of change in 
total average transfers, and the fourth model uses only the average change in the CPP and HIPC 
transfers. 
Models 3 and 4: Change in total average transfers (3) or average CPP and HIPC 
transfers (4) = β0+ β1 (Vote share for Evo Morales) + β2 (% Electricity) + β3 (Logged 
Population) + β4 (Population Density) + β5 (% Indigenous) + β6 (% Rural) + β7 (Total 
NGOs) + β8 (Voter Turnout)  
 + β7 (Vote Share for MAS) + β8 (Competitive Elections) + β9 (Region)  
+ β10 (Energy Spending) + β11 (Difference in the Average Social Spending)  
+ β6 12(Literacy) + ε 
Variables and Descriptive statistics: 
Transfers: 
To test the hypotheses, the difference between the total average transfers to the 
municipalities between 2001-2004 and 2005-2009 was used as the dependent variable. Transfers 
are a good indicator of government responsiveness because they are directed from the federal 
government to the municipalities. Transfers from the government include the Co-participation 
Transfers (Coparticipacion Tributaria, CPP) from shared national tax revenue, which provides 
the majority of the municipal revenue, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Relief (HIPC), and 
the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH). In some small municipalities, approximately 80% of the 
revenue comes from the CPP and remaining transfers such as the HIPC and the IDH constitute 
approximately 20% of the revenue (Fretes-Cibils et al, 2006). Even larger municipalities are 
dependent on transfers from the federal government, and on average, only 40% of their 
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expenditures are from their own revenue (Inchuaste, 2009). There are certain regulations and 
criteria for the amount of each type of transfer that is directed to each municipality, but there is 
variation within the broader criteria that could allow for targeted spending. The first step in the 
analysis of transfers is to understand the basic rules for the transfers, how they should operate, 
and why there might be deviations. Based on an analysis of Bolivian transfers, there are several 
possible reasons why transfers are disproportional (Fretes-Cibils et al, 2006). The following 
model attempts to explain these differences and other potential reasons. 
The first major transfer to the municipalities is the Coparticipacion Tributaria (CPP, 
Figure 1). This transfer is based on national tax revenue, which is collected and then distributed 
to the municipalities based on population. This transfer was established with the Law of Popular 
Participation in 1994, which allocated 20% of national tax revenue directly to the municipalities 
(Inchuaste, 2009). This law also allowed municipalities to collect taxes, which is still a small 
portion of the total income. Currently with the CPP, departments receive 12 percent and the 
universities and municipalities receive 16 percent of shared national tax revenue (Fretes-Cibils et 
al, 2006). The allocation is on a per capita basis, which attempted to fix unequal distribution that 
favored cities over rural areas. It also required that a large portion of the Co-participation 
Transfers be directed towards public investment, which increased local spending in health and 
education (Inchuaste, 2009). Although national tax revenue is distributed based on municipal 
population an analysis of the municipality tax revenue indicated that there were differences in 
allocation that were not explained by population alone. 
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Figure 1: CPP Transfers from 2001 to 2009 in Bolivianos (Fichas Municipales Autonomia, 2009). 
 
Under debt relief from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Bolivia 
directs the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) transfer to municipalities (Figure 2). Bolivia 
was one of the first countries to receive debt relief in exchange for further structural adjustments 
and poverty reform. The intent of the HIPC was to redirect savings into poverty reduction 
programs (Inchuaste, 2009). The first HIPC relief was implemented in 1998, and the second in 
2001, which added requirements for increased health and education spending. The total HIPC 
relief amounted to almost US $1.7 billion in current value (Fretes-Cibils et al, 2006). The 
allocation of the HIPC favored poor municipalities, which were usually rural. Between 2001 and 
2004, only 24% of the HIPC went to large cities, while poor municipalities received 68% 
(Fretes-Cibils et al, 2006). The goal of the HIPC was to reduce poverty disparities between urban 
and rural areas, although there are mixed perspectives on the success of this initiative.  
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Figure 2: HIPC Transfers from 2001 to 2009 in Bolivianos (Fichas Municipales Autonomia, 2009). 
 
The last transfer, the IDH, is a direct tax on the hydrocarbons that was created in 2005 
(Figure 3). Regional differences occur because departmental royalties are allotted based on the 
amount of gas reserves that a department produces. Hydrocarbon production is concentrated in 
Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Pando, and Tarija, and royalties are concentrated here. Additionally, 
population is not involved in the allocation, and per capita transfer amounts can be even more 
unequal. Pando and Tarija benefit much more than other departments due to this system.  For 
example, Pando has twice the national per capita average IDH, while Tarija, which contains 86% 
of the gas reserves but has only 5% of the population, has an allocation three times the national 
average (Fretes-Cibils et al, 2006). Conversely, La Paz has a large population, but because it is 
not a producing department, it has much less per capita. Further analysis shows that energy 
spending and IDH transfers have a significant relationship as expected. To offset the imbalance, 
the Departmental Compensation Fund adds additional transfers to nonproducers to bring them up 
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to the national average. However, the redistribution depends on IEHD (Impuesto Especial sobre 
los Hidrocarburos y sus Derivados) funds, or the Special Tax on the Hydrocarbons and 
Derivatives, which is limited because IEDH funds grow more slowly than the royalties (Fretes-
Cibils et al, 2006). 
 
Figure 3: IDH Transfers from 2001 to 2009 in Bolivianos (Fichas Municipales Autonomia, 2009). 
 
 With each transfer having rules but many problems with allocation, differences from 
expected transfers are possible. Using this measure will indicate whether the federal government 
is distributing transfers significantly to particular groups or regions.  
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Figure 4: Total Average Transfers from 2001 to 2009 in Bolivianos (Fichas Municipales Autonomia, 
2009). The figure also shows the breakdown of each transfer (HIPC, IDH, and CPP) as a part of the total 
average transfers.  
 
Election data: 
 Election figures from an existing dataset created by Boulding (2010) were used to 
measure competition, participation in elections, and support for Evo Morales. The data is 
available from the Bolivian National Election Court (Corte Nacional de Bolivia; CNE, 2009). 
Vote share for Evo Morales came from the 2005 Presidential elections and was calculated based 
on votes for Morales divided by the total number of votes in each municipality. Voter turnout, 
vote share for MAS, and competition in elections were from the 2004 municipal elections. Voter 
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turnout is the number of registered voters that cast a ballot, measuring the total ballots to include 
blank or invalid ballots because that is often used as a measure of protest. For the competition 
variable, an election was considered competitive if the margin between the two largest parties 
was less than 3%. 
NGO data: 
Information from an existing dataset created by Boulding (2010) was used to measure the 
number of NGOs in each municipality. NGO data was collected from a Bolivian government 
registry published by the Vice-Ministry of Public Investment and Foreign Financing and is 
available online or as a published book (VIPFE). The NGO data has been updated five times 
since 1996, the most recent count taking place in 2004. The information is self-reported by 
NGOs and includes the acronym, name, country of origin and department where the NGO is 
registered.  There were 130 municipalities had no NGOs recorded in 2004.   
Control Variables:  
Control variables included measures from the 2001 Bolivian Census and other municipal 
figures. Census figures are available from the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística; INE, 2010) and were used from an existing dataset compiled by Boulding (2010). 
The controls from the 2001 Census included population (logged), the percent of the population 
that is rural (% rural), the percent of houses with electricity (% Houses with Electricity), the 
percent of the population that is indigenous (% Indigenous) and the percent of the population 
over age fifteen that is literate (% Literacy). Rural and indigenous indicators are especially 
important in the Bolivian case because much of Evo Morales core support comes from poor and 
rural areas, in which the population is mostly indigenous. Controlling for these factors allows the 
relationship between change in total average transfers and rural or indigenous populations to be 
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calculated to see if there is targeted spending to core supporters. The percent of houses with 
electricity was used as a substitute for income because there were many missing income figures 
(N=248) and electricity provided a similar control. Regressions were run using both controls and 
there was no difference in the results between percent of houses with electricity and income. 
Literacy was used as an additional control to analyze the effect of education levels on the change 
in transfers.  
Other controls, such as change in average social spending and change in energy spending 
were calculated using the original dataset from Fichas Municipales Autonomia. The difference in 
the average social spending was calculated as the difference in social spending between 2001-
2004 and 2005-2008 using municipality spending data. Social spending includes spending on 
health, education, sanitation and water, and urban planning. This control provided an indicator to 
test a relationship between increased transfers and increased social spending.  This is relevant 
because many previous studies use social spending indicators to measure government 
responsiveness, such as education or sanitation.  
 
Figure 5: Average Social Spending from 2001 to 2007 in Bolivianos (Fichas Municipales Autonomia, 
2009).  
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Change in energy spending was also calculated as the difference in energy spending 
between 2001-2004 and 2005-2008. It shows municipality spending in the energy sector. This 
variable was used to see if a relationship between energy spending and increased transfers 
existed. This controlled for energy to ensure that differences in transfers were not solely due to 
increased energy spending. 
 
 
Figure 6: Average Energy Spending from 2001 to 2007 in Bolivianos (Fichas Municipales Autonomia, 
2009).  
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Chapter Six: Results and Discussion 
Targeted Spending to Core or Swing Voters: 
The results of the OLS regression support the hypothesis that the Morales government 
directs transfers to swing voters at a higher rate than his core supporters. This discounts the 
alternative hypothesis that the Morales government is targeting his core supporters as his 
mandate would suggest. The regression between vote share for Evo Morales and the change in 
total average transfers shows a significant negative relationship (Table 1). The negative 
relationship shows that a municipality with a high vote share for Evo Morales receives a lower 
increase in transfers than a municipality with low support for Morales.  
Moreover, indicators that correlate with support for Evo Morales, such as indigenous or 
rural characteristics do not have any significant effect on the level of transfers. There was no 
relationship between indigenous or rural populations and increased average transfers (p=.32, 
p=.2, respectively). It would be expected that high levels of transfers going towards indigenous 
groups and rural areas would be related to the base of MAS and Evo Morales. These two groups 
tend to support Morales because of his platform and stated goals. Population density also has a 
significant relationship with increased average transfers (p=.052). This could further indicate that 
cities or other areas are being favored over rural areas. These findings are significant because 
they indicate that Evo Morales‘ government is not targeting spending to his core supporters. 
Lower levels of income also did not correlate with increased transfers, which show that 
pro-poor politics are not the driving force for increased transfers. There is a significant negative 
relationship between the percent of houses with electricity (indicator for income) and total 
transfers (p=.057).  This is interesting because there are many pro-poor initiatives and laws that 
have occurred through the federal government, but the change in total average transfers are not 
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based on poverty levels. Although much of Evo Morales rhetoric is based on pro-poor initiatives, 
there is a negative connection between poverty levels and increased transfers.  
Overall, these results suggest that Morales is not fulfilling his mandate to his core 
supporters. His government targets spending away from those who voted for him and the poor 
and does not have any significant transfers going towards indigenous or rural municipalities. 
This sets up an interesting discussion of the reasoning behind the targeted spending. The 
evidence supports the swing vote theory of government responsiveness and discounts the rhetoric 
of Evo Morales.  
Participation and Increasing Transfers: 
The third hypothesis, relating participation with increased total average transfers, showed 
a significant relationship. Indicators of high participation had huge correlations with increased 
average transfers. The total NGOs in 2004 and the change in the total average transfers had an 
especially significant relationship (P<.01).  Additionally, there was a significant relationship 
between voter turnout and the change in average transfers (P<.05). These results suggest that 
municipalities with high levels of participation and mobilization are receiving increased 
transfers. Evo Morales is targeting money specifically towards areas that are mobilized and 
active. 
The fourth hypothesis related competition to increased transfers and did not show a 
significant relationship. The results go against the electoral theory because competition in 
elections had no relationship with change in average transfers (p=.937).  Although competition is 
a potential indicator for government responsiveness, the insignificant relationship suggests that 
the Morales government is not responding specifically to competition by increasing transfers.  
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Table 1: The Relationship between Transfers and Vote Share for Evo Morales  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable 
Change in Total 
Average Transfers 
Change in total CPP 
and HIPC Transfers 
Change in Total 
Average Transfers 
Change in CPP and 
HIPC Transfers 
Vote share for Evo Morales  -1.54E+07** -3317858* -1.66E+07** -3908201** 
  (6306009) (1832816) (7125011) (1930170) 
% Houses with Electricity  -6591751* -2035416** -1.03E+07 -4057034* 
  (3446995) (875681.4) (8512540) (2303284) 
Log of the Population  3365771** 653058.6* 3650169** 956605.6** 
  (1349233) (362698.1) (1817927) (480346) 
Population Density 37310.13* 12884.89** 46903.06 17200.29 
  (19136.11) (5657.947) (35043.27) (10555.68) 
% Indigenous  -2324290 -378365 672603.1 370182.6 
  (2266467) (545186.7) (3056615) (794377.4) 
% Rural -53379.58 -2117.39 -71214.39 -8453.61 
  (41565.85) (9703.595) (54825.81) (15716.19) 
Total NGOs in 2004 1309725*** 352325*** 1292095*** 345025.1*** 
  (293334.5) (69683.98) (296008.3) (74710.54) 
Voter Turnout 1.55E+07** 1096910 1.43E+07* 1380872 
  (6677520) (1491211) (7316193) (1680144) 
Vote Share for MAS   714840.9 605597.9 
    (3781300) (1036436) 
Competitive Elections   99931.77 88379.73 
    (1267654) (343606) 
Region   253186.3 148134.5 
    (325935.9) (93292.06) 
Energy Spending   0.5827755 -0.50657 
    (1.43449) (0.315113) 
Change in Average Social 
Spending 
  
0.8602786 0.421959 
    (1.854498) (0.52408) 
Literacy   9782359 3599741* 
    (6862849) (1821929) 
Constant -2.51E+07* -4605248 -3.45E+07* -9956287* 
  (1.29E+07) (3256519) (1.97E+07) (5311336) 
N 310 310 307 307 
R-squared 0.7642 0.7436 0.7749 0.7773 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*P<.1     **P<.05    ***P<.01 
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This could mean that the threat of losing elections in places with close margins was not a 
primary motivator behind increased transfers. Instead, places with a dominant vote share against 
Morales showed increased average transfers. These results show that places with a strong hold 
against Morales received increased transfers, while those on the edge of support did not have a 
significant relationship.  
Controls and Increased Transfers: 
The controls showed the expected outcomes and do not change the overall findings. A 
significant relationship between population and increased transfers occurred. This is expected 
because the basis for a large portion of the federal transfers is population. The CPP is the largest 
transfer and it is allocated based on population. Population has a significant positive relationship 
with the change in total average transfers (P<.05). Because this control had the expected 
relationship, it does not affect the results.  
Additional controls specifically related to the influx of IDH transfers were regional and 
energy spending controls. Both region and energy spending had no significant relationship with 
increased average transfers. The IDH transfer is allocated more towards natural gas producing 
departments. Checking for the regional and energy spending variables prevented expected 
differences in the IDH from influencing the overall result. These controls were important 
because they show that there are specific differences that cannot be explained by the IDH 
equation for distributing funds.  
Vote share for MAS and the change in average social spending were not significant. This 
indicates that the significant relationship is between the national government and individuals and 
is not related to local party affiliations with MAS (p=.85). Moreover, the change in average 
social spending had no correlation with increased average transfers. This shows that 
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municipalities receiving more money are not necessarily using it for social programs. Using 
transfers instead of social spending as the dependent variable shows targeted spending in the 
Bolivian case.  
Literacy is the last control, and in one model it is significant. This could indicate that 
education levels play a role in increased transfers, but further study would be required to see if 
this relationship is sound. It is only significant with increased average transfers in one model 
(model 4, p<.05). Overall, the transfers do not alter the results, and with further study, could 
show additional factors leading to government responsiveness.  
Discussion: 
Overall, there are two ways to interpret these findings. The first is more negative, 
showing that Evo Morales is not fulfilling his mandate to the poor by increasing municipal 
resources in the places that voted him into power. The second shows that democracy in Bolivia 
functioning because Evo Morales is not using a clientelistic model to hand government transfers 
over to his supporters. Either way, this is an interesting finding in the context of the New Left. It 
discounts the idea that Evo Morales is simply a radical and a danger to the US because sweeping 
changes in transfers that might upturn the political system have not occurred. At the same time, it 
might provide support that his populist rhetoric that claims to support the poor and indigenous is 
not founded in specific targeted spending. If Evo Morales was fulfilling his pro-poor mandate, 
increased transfers to the poor are expected. Instead, they are not significantly targeted to any 
income bracket and are actually targeted away from Morales supporters. 
The first explanation of the results shows that Evo Morales is not fulfilling his stated 
mandate to the poor. His core supporters are indigenous and impoverished populations, but there 
is no direct evidence of him increasing transfers in their direction. These findings support Petras 
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and Veltmeyer (2009) in their argument that Evo Morales has actually pursued a moderate policy 
mandate. He has not taken drastic steps to disrupt the existing social order through governmental 
transfers. Instead, he is using them to target swing voters and broaden his base of support. 
Although he has initiated constitutional reforms that represent his ideals of action, the direct 
government transfers represent his actual spending contributions to his base. Those transfers are 
going away from his core constituents. Since 2006, Evo Morales has not provided his base with 
tangible increases in transfers compared with other groups. Not only are transfers not increasing 
specifically for his base, they are increasing in the opposite populations. Even though this might 
be a viable political decision, it goes against his stated goals and rhetoric. These results suggest 
that Evo Morales is not using transfers to benefit his core constituents and is instead attempting 
to make political gains with targeted spending.  
The second explanation shows that Evo Morales is not targeting spending to his core 
supporters, but takes it in a more positive light. Especially in a developing democracy, where 
clientelistic relationships are more common and the tendency towards corruption is higher, 
targeted spending towards core supporters can be problematic. If the Morales government did 
target funds towards core supporters simply to buy their votes, he could maintain a clientelistic 
relationship where he gains politically in exchange for basic economic benefits for his 
supporters. The idea that transfers are not following a clientelistic model could be positive for 
democracy in Bolivia because the government is not simply providing handouts in exchange for 
votes. However, this explanation would be more convincing if spending was not targeted 
towards any group. The fact that Morales is targeting spending away from his constituents 
lessens the probability that transfers are following a more democratic and less clientelistic model. 
         Government Responsiveness and Targeted Spending in Bolivia 68 
 
Morales is using targeted spending for political gains, but where he is targeting the spending is 
not consistent with his mandate. 
Although there are several ways to interpret these findings, it is difficult to understand 
Morales‘ specific constraints and motivations behind the transfers. The significance of the 
targeted spending indicates that there are actual decisions to target to certain places. However, 
Evo Morales must assure that the Bolivian government continues to function and maintains 
stability. For example, pressure from departments like Santa Cruz to increase autonomy and 
control gas reserves threatens Evo Morales‘ entire pro-poor program. Without the money from 
gas reserves, he would not have the ability to fund social programs. In this sense, Evo Morales 
might be attempting to broaden support and gain time to make changes later. Increasing support 
would allow him to better fulfill his mandate to the poor without a severe political backlash. 
Even so, this is a dangerous political move, because it is easy for Morales state that he is buying 
time to help later and  ignore these demands later on. However, the limited functioning of the 
Bolivian government also limits Morales and his ability to fulfill his mandate. There is a strong 
precedence for corruption and targeted spending in Bolivia. He is entering into institutions that 
have never functioned at a high or efficient level. In this sense, Morales faces problems within 
the system that he must counter before implementing his mandate. Overall, several constraints 
limit Morales in his ability to implement his mandate including regional conflict and institutional 
weakness.   
Although there is evidence that Morales is not fulfilling his mandate, there is also strong 
evidence that he is targeting spending to areas with high participation. This is an especially 
relevant finding for both Bolivia and developing democracies. In the context of Bolivia, Evo 
Morales claims to represent the social movements, and places with high activity are more likely 
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to have social movements and NGOs present to organize their demands and actions. This 
interesting finding is especially significant because it occurs over all four models with p<.01. 
This supports the participation theory of democracy, which is important because Bolivia is a 
developing democracy that has less functioning political institutions. Protest and forcing the 
government to acknowledge demands has been one successful way that Bolivians have organized 
in the past. At the same time, results from elections have not provided the changes for the poor 
that they would expect. In Bolivia, and perhaps in developing democracies, governments will 
respond to participation more than electoral pressure. As democracies consolidate, there might be 
a shift towards additional electoral significance in government responsiveness. These results 
indicate that participation is a primary factor of government responsiveness in developing 
democracies. 
Participation as a primary factor for government responsiveness continues to add to other 
scholars‘ findings such as Kohl and Boulding. Kohl (2003) notes that NGOs in Bolivia are 
important at the local level because they provide resources and support. They are intertwined 
with the political and social character of municipalities because they help with development and 
provide avenues for community participation. Boulding (2010) adds that NGOs facilitate 
participation because they provide opportunities for association. Overall, NGOs have a large role 
in Bolivia and affect participation and government responsiveness. The significant relationship 
between increased transfers and NGO activity furthers this argument. It shows that the 
organization that NGOs provide to communities can extend beyond development and protest and 
lead to specific political consequences.  
The significance of participation furthers the study of democracy in Latin America 
because it supports certain factors that favor government responsiveness. Participation and the 
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swing voter theories are both supported through these findings. Moreover, instead of using social 
spending, which does not show any significance in this model, transfers are direct from the 
federal to the local level and provide a different indicator for further research on government 
responsiveness. 
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Conclusion: 
The rise of Evo Morales represented a historic moment in Bolivia‘s history. With such a 
large mandate for change, however, it was important to evaluate his responsiveness to the 
majority of Bolivians that elected him. This prompted the question: what conditions, if any, do 
political parties in developing democracies fulfill their mandates to the poor by increasing social 
spending? Moving past rhetoric or larger groupings of the New Left, this thesis brought insight 
into the debate of government responsiveness in developing democracies. It evaluated Evo 
Morales‘ unique mandate to the poor and found that he is not increasing targeted spending to 
core supporters. Instead, areas that have swing voters and high levels of participation are 
receiving targeted transfers. These results suggest that participation and swing vote-status are 
two factors that influence government responsiveness. They each had a significant relationship 
with increased average transfers under the Morales administration, which shows targeted 
spending to these specific groups. Although this thesis provided two factors that influence 
government responsiveness, it also opened up new questions about government responsiveness.  
The ideas presented in this thesis open up a range of debates and prompt further study of 
government responsiveness in Latin America. It raises the question, are their specific factors 
within swing vote municipalities that increase the likelihood of targeted spending? For example, 
within municipalities that did not vote for Evo Morales, it would help to know if there is a 
difference between indigenous or non-indigenous and poor or wealthy communities. This further 
breakdown might allow the transfers that are directed away from core supporters to make more 
sense. It also raises the question, what other possible avenues is Evo Morales using to fulfill his 
mandate to the poor? Although transfers provide a good indicator of government responsiveness 
it is important to explore other ways that Evo Morales could be targeting his core supporters. 
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Further information about types of NGOs and the relationship of other local organizations such 
as OTBs or OCs also could add to the findings. Additional methods of research such as 
ethnographic study or public opinion data could also further this discussion by providing the 
public‘s perception of government responsiveness in Bolivia. Other perspectives would further 
complete the picture of government responsiveness in Bolivia. These findings open up the debate 
for future research, while providing significant results to further the study of democratic 
responsiveness.  
 The importance of these findings extends beyond the Bolivian case. Within Latin 
America, these findings are important for analysis of the New Left. Bolivia is often seen as a 
radical country based on the rhetoric of Evo Morales and his ties to Hugo Chavez. However, this 
thesis calls into question Morales‘ actual policy initiatives, which are much more moderate in 
nature. Uncovering differences from broad trends and developing a study of the New Left that 
looks past categories is helpful to see what is actually occurring in Latin America. Understanding 
similarities and differences between Latin American regimes is important for policy, perspective, 
and further academic analysis. It is easy to oversimplify the debate of the New Left and many 
scholars have emotional responses when they hear words like ―radical‖ or ―socialism,‖ but 
quantitative data adds meaning to this debate because it provides a tangible analysis of outcomes.  
Insight into the Bolivian case also provides more information about government 
responsiveness in developing democracies. Developing democracies face specific constraints as 
they work through consolidation and build credibility. Because those constraints are often 
different from established democracies, democratic responsiveness also may differ. Politicians in 
developing democracies may be limited in their ability to fulfill their mandates to their core 
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supporters or they may choose to expand their base because of political gains. Either way, 
targeting swing voters instead of core supporters is an interesting finding.  
Furthermore, one of the most important ideas stemming from this thesis is the analysis of 
participation. Participation was the most significant predictor of government responsiveness in 
Bolivia. In developing democracies, where institutions are unable or unwilling to meet the 
demands of the citizens, direct pressure is often the only way to gain change.  However, it is 
working as a tool for governments to respond. The analysis of participation is timely because 
new social movements and NGOs have recently developed and become more influential. Bolivia, 
with its large indigenous population and huge mobilization for protests is an active example of 
participation. However, these results may extend to other developing democracies where 
political pressure is a major method for gaining change.  Participation outside of elections is a 
factor in government responsiveness. This prompts further discussion of how developing 
democracies function, both within their political institutions and from outside. 
Overall, Evo Morales political response has not reflected the mandate given by the 
majority of Bolivians. However, Bolivia‘s unique political changes and broad mobilization 
further the study of government responsiveness. Although the election of Evo Morales was a 
historic moment for Bolivia‘s marginalized groups, it may have only been the beginning. 
Bolivia‘s recent changes to its institutions and structure allowed for more formal participation of 
marginalized groups. Those groups succeeded in using the structure to bring a candidate that 
represents them more than ever before to the presidency. However, Bolivia has not finished its 
democratic development. Continuing democratic consolidation may create a system that 
responds better and better to the people of Bolivia. The analysis of the Morales government 
shows that the country is responding to specific factors, and these may expand in the future.  
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